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AQP   Any Qualified Provider 
AT   (NHS England) Area Team 
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Introduction 
 
Policy background 
A wide ranging set of reforms is being introduced into the English NHS. The reforms are designed to 
increase the market-like behaviour of providers of care with a view to improving efficiency, quality 
and responsiveness of services (DH, 2005; Health and Social Care Act, 2012; ‘HSCA 2012’) and they 
span the New Labour government and current Coalition government regimes. The idea behind these 
reforms is that competition between a wider range of providers will produce the desired results such 
as improved quality and greater efficiency. At the same time, it is still necessary for providers of care 
to cooperate with each other in order to deliver high quality care. There are many aspects of care 
quality where cooperation is needed, such as continuity of care as patients move between 
organisations, and sharing of knowledge between clinicians.  
Documents such as the Principles and rules for cooperation and competition (DH, 2010) (and more 
recently, HSCA 2012) explained how the NHS was required to deal with competition and cooperation 
simultaneously. The principles included the requirement for ‘providers and commissioners to 
cooperate to deliver seamless and sustainable care to patients’ (principle 4), while also prohibiting 
commissioners and providers from reaching ‘agreements which restrict commissioner or patient 
choice against patients’ or taxpayers’ interests’ (principle 6). Similar principles are enshrined in the 
HSCA 2012, as supplemented by guidance issued by Monitor. Moreover, a Statutory Instrument was 
issued under the HSCA 2012 which set out the rules governing procurement of health services by 
NHS commissioners , indicating that competitive procurement is to be preferred (The National 
Health Service Procurement Patient Choice and Competition No 2 Regulations 2013). A national panel 
was established to interpret the principles (the Cooperation and Competition Panel, CCP) and advise 
the NHS on what behaviours were acceptable. Under the HSCA 2012, Monitor (as the new economic 
regulator) took over some of the functions of the CCP and along with the national competition 
authorities (being, since April 2014 the Competition and Markets Authority, and prior to that, The 
Office of Fair Trading, OFT, and the Competition Commission (CC)  has powers to enforce 
competition law to prevent anti-competitive behaviour. At the same time Monitor is also 
responsible for promoting co-operation. HSCA 2012, section 66 (2) (e) states that  Monitor must 
have regard to ‘the desirability of persons who provide health care services for the purposes of the 
NHS co-operating with each other in order to improve the quality of health care services provided 
for those purposes’.  It is the role of NHS commissioners (including Clinical Commissioning Groups  
‘CCGs’), however, to ensure that the appropriate levels of competition and cooperation exist in their 
local health economies (HSCA, 2012). 
Need for research 
While studies have noted that incentives for competition and cooperation exist in healthcare 
(Goddard and Mannion, 1998; Kurunmaki 1999), few have researched the interaction between the 
two.  Although there is research about the effects of competition in the NHS reforms introduced by 
New Labour (e.g. Cooper et al, 2010; Gaynor et al, 2011), there remains a need to investigate the 
way in which local health systems  are managed to ensure that cooperative behaviour is 
appropriately coexisting with competition. Some specific forms of cooperation have been evaluated 
5 
 
(such as integrated care organisations, DH 2009,  and clinical networks, e.g. Ferlie et al, 2010), but it 
does not appear that the general manner in which local health systems are being managed to 
balance competition and cooperation under the current reforms is being investigated.  
Study of commissioning through competition and cooperation 
For this reason, PRUComm is undertaking a project to investigate how commissioners in local health 
systems manage the interplay of competition and cooperation in their local health economies, 
looking at acute and community health services (CHS). The research questions are: 
 How do commissioners and the organisations they commission from understand the policy 
and regulatory environment, including incentives for competition and co-operation?  
 In the current environment, which encourages both competition and cooperation, how do 
commissioning organisations and providers approach their relationships with each other in 
order to undertake the planning and delivery of care for patients?  
 In particular, how do commissioning organisations use or shape the local provider 
environment to secure high quality care for patients? This entails examining how CCGs’ 
commissioning strategies take account of the local configuration of providers and the degree 
to which they seek to use or enhance competition and/or encourage cooperation to improve 
services. 
This interim report deals with the first research question concerning commissioners’ and 
providers’ respective understandings of the policy and regulatory environment in which they 
operate. 
Study Design and Methods 
In-depth case studies are being used to investigate how commissioners approach their roles as 
shapers of the local health system in respect of competition and cooperation issues.  
After agreeing the protocol for the study with DH in January 2013, we began a time consuming 
process of securing numerous research governance approvals necessary for undertaking this piece of 
research. Internal LSHTM Research Ethics Committee permission was granted in June 2013. We were 
also obliged to apply for NHS Research Passports for all researchers working on the project through 
one of our participating case study sites. Despite securing the NHS Research Passports we had to 
seek further separate research governance approvals from each NHS organisation that we intended 
to approach for interviews. Each NHS organisation, about 20 in total, had separate requirements and 
processes for granting research governance permissions. Only after securing an individual 
organisation’s permission  were we able to approach its senior staff for an interview. All in all, 
arranging research governance was a considerable task , as in many cases it was not immediately 
apparent which individual in a particular organisation was in a position to grant such an approval, or 
what procedures we were required to follow. This required a substantial research staff input and 
delayed the commencement of field work until the summer of 2013.  
In the first phase of the field work for the study, between August 2013 and June 2014, we carried 
out 33 interviews with senior commissioners (13) and provider managers  (20), including 
6 
 
independent providers, in four CCGs across England. Case study sites comprise a mix of rural and 
urban settings and are located in the North, North West, Midlands and London (see Table 1).  
Table 1. Interviews in case study sites 
Case study site Location of CCG No. of interviews 
CCG1 Rural, North East 10 
CCG2 Urban, Midlands 9 
CCG3 Mixed, North West 7 
CCG4 Outer London 7 
 
All but one interviewed commissioner were senior level managers such as Chief Operating Officer, 
Finance Director or Head of Contracts. In one instance we interviewed a former GP commissioner. 
Similarly, the vast majority of interviewed provider managers did not have a clinical background and 
were senior managers working for provider organisations.  
The interviews explored commissioners’ and providers’ understanding of policy and regulations 
regarding the use of competition and cooperation in commissioning NHS services. We also explored 
their experiences of tendering and bidding for tenders as well as collaborative working. 
In this interim report we focus on outlining the views of commissioners and providers of the 
regulatory landscape, in particular their understanding of regulations, amount of local discretion, 
role of sector regulators, impact of HSCA 2012 and incentives to cooperate and compete. The final 
report at the end of 2015 will deal with the other research questions which we are currently 
investigating. 
In order to give a context to the understanding and views of local commissioners and providers, we 
include a timeline of nationally reported key policy decisions, regulations, guidance and events 
pertaining to competition and cooperation in the English NHS covering the period between March 
2013 and June 2014 (see Appendix 1). The timeline has been compiled by including official guidance 
and decisions from websites such as Monitor and the Competition Commission, as well as 
monitoring specialist press titles such as Health Services Journal, Health Investor and Pulse for 
relevant reporting.  
Before moving to discuss the interim findings we provide a brief sketch of local health economies in 
the four case study sites. 
Case study sites 
CCG1 
The CCG1 is located in the North of England and covers a population smaller than the average for 
CCGs in England. There is a diverse population – with areas of deprivation and affluence – as well as 
a very high number of older people. The area covered by CCG1 has areas of high population density 
in its largest town but also incorporates rural areas with low population density.  
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The CCG1 area crosses local authority (LA) boundaries, approximately two thirds of the population 
living in one Council area and one third in the other. CCG1 was formed with the abolition of two 
Primary Care Trusts (PCTs).  
There is one main acute provider which is an NHS Foundation Trust (FT). It provides services from its 
main hospital site as well as community health services (CHS) from health centres and general 
practices in the community. 
There are two main CHS providers one of which is the main acute provider and the other is an NHS 
trust dedicated to CHS. One trust provides community services to one district of CCG1 and the other 
provides it to the other two districts. The rationale for the configuration of these two providers is 
historical from the PCT. The CCG has carried out a CHS review and is considering the need to re-
procure the community nursing service. It is still uncertain at the time of writing (October 2014) 
whether it will go out to tender.  
At the end of 2013 CCG1 agreed to adopt the integrated care vision proposal and approach to 
improving the lives of local people, including frail and vulnerable people. The integrated care 
approach will capitalise on the investment by partners in a single shared electronic patient record 
giving people, their carers and health and social care professionals access to the information they 
need to deliver effective support.  
Partners across the local health and social care economy have also signed up to the CCG’s 
programme to deliver integrated care for adults. The CCG’s strategic objectives focus on 
transforming planned care, MH services and urgent care.  
CCG2 
CCG2 is located in the Midlands and crosses the boundaries of two local authorities, covering all of 
one and part of another. In both local authority areas served by the CCG, the health outcomes are 
relatively poor, with high levels of deprivation, health inequalities and reduced life expectancy 
compared with the England average.  There are significant numbers of minority ethnic groups within 
this population who experience higher health needs. 
The governing body papers indicate that the CCG2 is in financial balance. The major health issue for 
the CCG is transferring care from hospital to the community. A local programme has been running in 
the CCG’s area for some years.  This is a collaboration between the local authorities and CCG, acute 
hospitals, mental health and community health care trusts and could be seen as a precursor to the 
Better Care Fund.   
There are several acute providers, many of which are FTs, to the CCG, with the major provider 
accounting for just over half of total acute spend by CCG2. This trust is undertaking a programme of 
transferring some services to community settings to support the vision of delivering care closer to 
home. CHS are provided also by several trusts. The major provider of CHS is an acute trust 
accounting for 57% of the CCG’s spend.   
Mental Health (MH) services are provided by three trusts.  Two trusts take all but 0.5% of this and 
are FTs.  All three provide services to other CCGs in the region.   
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The main challenge for commissioners in CCG2 at present is the continuation of the programme of 
shifting resources and services from acute providers to the community in the context of financial 
pressures and variable local health needs.    At the same time, commissioners are obliged to contract 
with large acute providers with considerable market power. 
CCG3 
CCG3 is located in the North West of England. The diverse population includes large urban 
conurbations through to rural villages. According to the Government’s ‘Indices of Deprivation’, the 
overall quality of life is good for many residents (in the wider LA area); however there are areas of 
significant socio-economic deprivation and rural isolation.  
There is one main acute care provider – a large district general hospital, split across two sites. The 
financial position of this FT is extremely tight.  There is also one main FT provider of MH and CHS.  
In addition, there are some small independent hospitals and a small independent out of hospital 
provider which hold (small) contracts with the CCG. However, there is no history of larger 
independent providers in the area. 
The CCG has an overarching strategy for joint working between health and social care locally and for 
moving care out of hospital into a community setting where suitable.  
A Better Care Fund (BCF) Plan has been agreed locally (between the local authority and multiple 
CCGs) which includes outcomes to support the overarching local commissioning strategy. The CCG’s 
ambition is to incentivise collaboration across care settings to achieve its plans.  
CCG4 
CCG4 is coterminous with an Outer London borough. Its population is generally wealthy and it boasts 
good health outcomes. The population is served predominantly by the two acute hospitals taking up 
the bulk of the CCG’s acute spend. Due to the density of acute provision in this part of London, local 
patients also utilise other London hospitals to a smaller extent. The two main acute hospitals serving 
the population of CCG4 have been part of two different hospital reconfiguration programmes aiming 
to concentrate services onto fewer sites.  
There is an NHS CHS provider which also provides services to the neighbouring CCG. The future of 
the CHS  provider is somewhat uncertain as the plans to establish it as an Integrated Care 
Organisation (ICO) with a view to acquiring Foundation Trust status have fallen through. Recently, 
the CCG undertook an internal consultation amongst GPs on the quality of services provided by the 
CHS provider with a view to re-commissioning the service.  
CCG4 has two MH service providers. The primary care MH services were retendered three years ago. 
A new provider won the tender and took some of the activity away from an incumbent one. 
According to the CCG’s management this led to a considerable improvement in quality and 
responsiveness of the community MH services. Currently each organisation delivers different types 
of MH services for the population. 
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The commissioners have a long standing strategy to move more care out of hospital and into 
community settings. The need for coordination of a number of services which have been set up with 
a purpose of achieving this goal has been heightened by the requirements imposed by the Better 
Care Fund (BCF) policy initiative. For the purpose of the BCF commissioners decided to focus on 
services for the frail elderly population. This work runs in parallel with evaluation of the main CHS 
provider. The CCG adopted an outcome based commissioning approach to guide a process for re-
commissioning the services provided by the community provider. At the time of writing (October 
2014)  it has not been decided whether this will involve a competitive tender.  
Commissioners’ views on regulations 
We begin by reporting the views of commissioners concerning the current regulatory structures. 
Understanding of current policy  
As actors’ understandings of the rules under which they operate are crucial in determining their 
behaviour, we started by asking commissioners what their respective understandings of the current 
policy rules were. 
Commissioners considered the current policy confusing as they were being expected to both drive 
competition and integrate services which they found to be contradictory: 
Those two drivers can compete against each other.  (Commissioner 3, CCG4, May 2014) 
One commissioner (CCG2) commented that he thought that current policy would cause problems in 
future: 
This looks like a fix to fix the thing they c****d up the first time and it’s going to cause 
problems as well.  It really annoys me.  (Commissioner 1, CCG2, November 2013) 
Additional inconsistency was seen by commissioners when they compared the types of services that 
could be subject to competitive procurement.  One commissioner noted that there were services 
commissioned by the CCG with a turnover higher than the trigger for competitive procurement and 
she did not know how they could be competitively procured: 
you can look at the b****y formula and say “It’s more than 98 grand over a five year 
period… you’ve got to go out to competition”… I’ve got many [contracts] at the moment that 
are over 98,000 and have I got a route to procurement for them all?  No.  (Commissioner 1, 
CCG4, November 2013) 
Another commissioner made similar observations (CCG3) about the differences in the practicality of 
tendering between acute and community services.  He considered that it was not realistic to tender 
acute contracts because there were no alternative providers and it would be “… a complete and 
utter waste of public money” (Commissioner 1, CCG3, August 2013).  This commissioner noted that 
the rules appeared to be different for community services as there were alternative providers willing 
to enter the market.  A commissioner in a different CCG (CCG2) reported that although they 
preferred to work collaboratively with providers to deliver service reconfiguration, large 
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partnerships between several providers were thought to restrict use of competitive procurement to 
reconfigure services as they were seen to be bureaucratic.     
Some commissioners were awaiting guidance on how to implement policy, or commented that 
where there was guidance, interpretation was likened to “trawling through treacle” (Commissioner 
1, CCG1, May 2014).  This commissioner considered that the ambiguity led to people over-
complicating policy implementation.   
When asked about their understanding about whether the current policy configuration required 
them to tender all services, the interviewed commissioners were convinced that this was not the 
case. In their view the need to tender depended on whether the service was “extremely specialized” 
and could be provided only by a certain provider (Commissioner 4, CCG1, April 2014). Another 
commissioner (Commissioner 6, CCG1) from the same CCG made a distinction between expansion of 
existing services with good outcomes which, in their opinion, could bypass the procurement; and 
setting up new services with new specifications which ought to go to full tender. In general, there 
was an agreement that although there was no mandate to tender all services there was a 
requirement to justify why competitive procurement was not followed.  
We don’t have to tender all services, there are exceptions.  But I think the default position is 
that we are expected to tender services, as a generality.  So we have to, I think, the 
expectation is that you will explain why you haven’t (Commissioner 1, CCG2, November 
2013)  
Commissioners from CCG3 drew attention to a perceived anomaly concerning the pressure 
commissioners experienced from regulators to put CHS out to tender, whilst acute services although 
based on 12 month contracts, were exempt from this pressure. Furthermore they mentioned that 
some acute providers were supporting opening up the community sector to competition as they saw 
it as “as an opportunity to drive out some of the efficiencies and take the benefit” (Commissioner 1, 
CCG3, August 2013).  
The same commissioner felt that there was also a hindering lack of clear guidance as to whether 
Local Enhanced Services (LES) currently provided by GP practices ought to be put out to tender. 
According to the commissioner, primary care services were previously subject to the same 
“written/unwritten rule” as acute services excluding them from the need to tender but since the 
new regulations came into effect this ceased to be a clear cut case. This was because there were 
other providers capable of delivering LES services and of challenging CCG decisions. 
We’ve got three and a half million pounds worth of LESs. There’s probably about 15 of them. 
We keep waiting for the guidance, and everyone just keeps ignoring it now. For me it is 
massive confusion, because if you talk to the procurement people who interpret the 
legislation they’re saying that’s what it says. But those with a bit of common sense are 
saying we can’t do that, it’s daft. But they’re going what’s the rules (...)? And you think okay, 
fine, so give me some definitive guidance then please. You can’t get that guidance anywhere. 
It’s a real confusion in the system. (Commissioner 1, CCG3, August 2013) 
CCG4 commissioners also agreed that there was no need to tender all services but emphasised that 
one had to be aware that not doing so might expose the CCG to risk of challenges from potential 
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providers. Furthermore the interviewed commissioner noted it would take time and a change of 
culture for NHS commissioners to embrace tendering as “customary practice” (Commissioner 1, 
CCG4, November 2013). Yet, another commissioner pointed out that there were practical obstacles, 
such as of lack of organisational capacity, meaning that CCGs were unable to tender all services even 
if they had to or wished to do so.  
We do not have to tender out all of those services, because if we do, actually it is a massive 
resource.  So I think we have to be very careful about which services we decide to procure 
and how many procurement processes we go through in any one year, because they are a 
massive drain on resources and in time and people.  So it is absolutely key that we take these 
decisions very carefully. (Commissioner 3, CCG4, May 2014) 
There were no differences between case study sites as to views about the need to tender all 
services. Commissioners pointed out that they have some discretion over such decisions yet they 
have to justify their decision making processes.  
Amount of local discretion 
Commissioners were asked how much local discretion they had in the current policy set up to make 
commissioning decisions. The opinions varied as to the level of discretion they had and the matters 
over which such discretion could be exercised.  
One commissioner from CCG1 spoke about heightened anxiety they experienced when having to 
decide whether to open some services to tender or not, in this case in relation to primary care 
services commissioned as part of the LES arrangement. The vagueness of section 75 and subsequent 
regulations (i.e. The National Health Service Procurement Patient Choice and Competition No 2 
Regulations 2013)  allowed for  considerable discretion in taking decisions but at the same time 
heightened uncertainty for commissioners. 
It’s really quite difficult to see whether you could actually do certain things; and I had to get 
a lot of guidance from more experienced procurement colleagues, sort of saying, ‘am I going 
on the right track, am I okay just to keep it like this, am I breaching the rules by not opening 
it out to tender at this point but just keeping a status quo going?’  (Commissioner 1, CCG1, 
May 2014) 
Another commissioner from CCG1 reflected that CCGs had no discretion over high level principles 
guiding their relationship with the local trusts. According to this interviewee, the mandate of 
commercialisation of relationships between commissioners and providers hampered attempts to 
take overall ownership of local “health and social care society” and promote collaboration. They 
went on to suggest that the move to some sort of lead provider model under which providers were 
given a set budget and were expected to coordinate service provision against agreed outcomes 
would be beneficial in remedying this negative effect of marketisation of NHS. 
The experiences of other commissioners suggest that there is an inverse relationship between the 
lack of specific regulations and the amount of local discretion in commissioning. 
I think we’ve got the flexibility, because it’s a locally commissioned service, so we commission 
for the needs of the population.  It’s perhaps more of a lack of support when we’re needing 
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guidance, that we don’t have.  So flexibility-wise, I think we’ve got a mandate to be able to 
procure services appropriately, and with proportionality and transparency – having read the 
guidance on several occasions – to be able to deliver that.  But it’s dependent on the 
commissioning intentions and each CCG’s priorities.  But yeah, it’s more around guidance and 
support where we’ve had particular issues, so in terms of…it feels like there’s an 
unwillingness to put a line in the sand for something and say, this is our stance. 
(Commissioner 5, CCG1, April 2014) 
Lack of explicit, unambiguous guidance with regards to the role of competition and tendering in 
commissioning clinical services could in some cases play to commissioners’ advantage by increasing 
their freedom. However it also increased the freedom of providers to challenge commissioning 
decisions and/or to interpret the regulatory uncertainty to their advantage. In particular, a 
Commissioner from CCG1 mentioned a case of a private provider offering maternity services in the 
region and expecting to be paid by the CCGs despite not being commissioned by the CCGs. Such 
provider behaviour, driven by patient choice and effectively bypassing commissioners, undermined 
the level of control commissioners had over their local health economies.  
The same interviewee remarked that although the CCG had discretion over whether to tender the 
service or not, it spent a lot of energy on finding robust justifications for not having to go out to 
tender. The commissioner shared an example of a recent extension of coverage of a particular 
community health service which was available previously only in one part of the CCG. The CCG took 
the decision to extend the service from the current provider on a pilot basis rather than go through a 
lengthy and costly procurement process. 
I’ve commissioned it from Trust X as a pilot and I’m thinking about how I’m going to do it and 
I’ve done that on a clinical governance issue, but really I should procure it and I’m dreading 
it. (...) I’m dreading I’m going to have to go out to procurement, because I can’t be…I’ve been 
doing it for a pilot for a year. (...) until I can get my head around how I can get around not 
procuring this. (Commissioner 6, CCG1, November 2013) 
A CCG2 commissioner noted that their default position or preferred option was to encourage local 
providers to cooperate and transform services through “the development of local planning” rather 
than by using tendering. However at the same time they were mindful that this could be deemed as 
“heresy” and they were cautious of publicising their approach. 
The overarching commissioning strategy is to progressively shift, over the next five years, 
resources away from hospital and into the community.  And the plan to do that essentially is 
through a managed change process of working with existing providers using the independent 
and voluntary sector locally to supplement that and using the private sector occasionally 
around specific things. (Commissioner 1, CCG2, November 2013) 
The same commissioner commented on the lack of discretion in respect of some national policy 
initiatives, in this case a mandate to choose some CHS to be subject to the Any Qualified Provider 
policy (AQP), under which patients would be entitled to choose any licensed provider of such 
services which had been approved by the CCG. This policy did not make sense to them locally.   
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In general, the interviewee remarked that often commissioners’ strategy was to comply with the 
national framework but immediately find ways round it to adapt to the local circumstances 
(Commissioner 1, CCG2, November 2013). 
Another commissioner from CCG3 spoke in similar terms about trying to use the discretion not to 
tender the services, in this case LES services, and finding ways to “get away with it”.  One of such 
ways referred to bypassing the AQP policy mandate by interpreting that it applied to the wider 
cluster of CCGs rather than smaller former PCT footprint. The commissioner believed that on this 
occasion they managed to “get away with it” as AQP policy had lost the national priority status. 
It became a bit of a game, because you had to put the three [services] out [to AQP], and 
there was, is it three per PCT or is it three per cluster? We all went ‘ah’. Because [CCG X] have 
done loads of these AQPs, so we said okay, we’ve done our three as [CCG X] have done them. 
Then it all went a bit quiet, and then they had the massive reorganisation, and the 
assumption is that department who are driving that through have gone because they’ve 
gone very quiet on it. So there is no national programme, there is no national list. They tried 
to create that list. That’s gone. Now it’s just a tool. And AQP is just a tool. (Commissioner 1, 
CCG3, August 2013) 
The same interviewee stressed that their first step was to identify local priorities and gather “local 
intelligence” about service provision (Commissioner 1, CCG3). Similarly to CCG2 they preferred to 
adopt a local plan through building strong relationships with local providers. In that sense the 
interviewed commissioner reflected on the already mentioned benefits that lack of clear top down 
guidance brought in terms of widening local discretion. 
You complain about the lack of guidance, but whilst we have a lack of guidance and nobody 
shouts at us about doing something wrong then it actually works to your benefit in a patch 
like this. (Commissioner 1, CCG3, August 2013) 
CCG4 commissioners also preferred to balance national policies with local considerations. According 
to one commissioner the decision to use competitive tendering or not was a matter of “judgement” 
(Commissioner 1, CCG4, November 2013). The competitive tendering itself was seen as one of the 
levers to improve services and thus a useful tool that should not be dismissed. The commissioner 
also pointed out the legal risks to which the CCG was exposing itself by not going down the 
tendering route. One can argue that CCG4 commissioners were most at ease about using 
competitive tendering out of all case study sites.  
Overall, the commissioners agreed that there is some flexibility for local decision making within the 
current commissioning system but making use of such local discretion often depended on finding 
ingenious ways round the system. The use of local discretion was being undermined, on one hand, 
by the prescriptive, top down policies and, on the other hand, by potential challenges from providers 
raising a prospect of costly litigation. We noted a slight difference between case study sites, with 
London based CCG4 appearing to be much more at ease with using competitive tendering as part of 
their service transformation strategy than case study sites based in other parts of England. The latter 
group emphasised the importance of fostering relationships with the current providers and used 
tendering only as a last resort option. The difference may be due to the nature of markets, with 
CCG4 having a wider pool of potential providers than those based in more isolated, rural 
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communities. Yet it might also be due to commissioning styles of individual CCG leaders, as the 
geographical profile of CCG2 does not neatly fit this explanation.  
Views on the role of sector regulators 
It was also important to find out commissioners’ views of the various sector regulators, as this also 
had a bearing on their behaviour at the local level. 
The recent policy changes combined with a lack of specific guidance resulted in commissioners 
having to consult sector regulators on some occasions. The interviewed commissioners from the 
four case study sites have been in contact with a number of regulators including the CCP (pre-April 
2013), Monitor, NHS England (NHSE), Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), Trust Development 
Authority (TDA) and Care Quality Commission (CQC). Commissioners were often quite critical of the 
role of sector regulators, mainly due to their alleged inability to provide clear guidance in particular 
cases. 
According to one commissioner from CCG1 Monitor’s approach has changed since it took on more 
powers post-April 2013. Whereas before the attention was mainly on managing providers, now the 
CCG experienced a more hands on, direct scrutiny of commissioning practices.  
 [Monitor’s] role’s changed now, and it used to be just that they spoke to the provider and we 
didn’t really get involved, but now it’s everybody; and they’re very, quite directive really, and 
they will ring up and say, what’s happening (Commissioner 2, CCG1, March 2014) 
Another commissioner expressed the view that the system as a whole, and sector regulators in 
particular, as interpreters of the policy could not seem to decide whether the priorities lay with 
increasing competition or with fostering integration among providers. In the commissioner’s 
perception the regulatory forces pulled in opposite directions, which left local commissioners in a 
difficult place. Such a view was a consequence in part of the decision to reject a merger proposal 
between the Royal Bournemouth and Christchurch Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust and Poole 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust hospitals taken in October 2013 by the Competition Commission (see 
Appendix 1, item 17), which sent shock waves through commissioning world.   
You know, the debacle of Poole and Bournemouth, crikey.  You know, ten years ago that 
merger would have just happened.  They'd have done a public consultation and whatever, 
but it would have just happened because it was the right thing from a quality patient side of 
things and the right thing from a commercial viability, and recognising really in Poole and 
Bournemouth, (...), there's no choice.  Do you know what I mean?  You've got two DGHs a 
few miles apart from each other, Poole going to Poole, Bournemouth going to Bournemouth.  
And for them to both do everything a DGH does, considering the scarce resources there are in 
workforce and cost, it makes no sense at all.  So you've got to have bigger cost effective 
teams in one location, not two.  So it was absolute bonkers to say, oh, well, actually you need 
two hospitals because patients need choice.  But they don't because they don't choose choice 
now, they go one or the other.  So you're not taking that choice away, you're just…so it's all 
bonkers, all absolutely bonkers, choice. (Commissioner 3, CCG1, April 2014) 
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Another CCG1 commissioner expressed their disappointment over the lack of clear guidance from 
Monitor after the CCG came across a private maternity provider billing them for activity which had 
not been contracted.  
Commissioners perceived Monitor’s stance as “very wishy-washy” and saw their interventions as not 
“effective” or “timely” (Commissioner 4, CCG1, April 2014). CCG1 had spent a lot of time answering 
lengthy inquiries from Monitor and having to defend their position after being accused of preventing 
competition. The protracted discussions gained an additional sense of urgency for the CCG as they 
also had some quality concerns about the provider. 
If Monitor say, you have to pay for that and you are breaking the anti-competition laws, any 
private provider anywhere in the whole of the country can come and on our patch say, ‘we’re 
going to start doing cataracts on your patch and we’re paying for it under non contracted 
activity.’  (...) So I’m not confident in Monitor actually in what do they understand what 
they’re doing, to be honest with you, I don’t quite know, because they keep ringing us and 
saying, ‘what’s your interpretation of the PBR Rules?’   We’re not quite sure…and I’m just 
thinking, Lord, we have got women at risk here and Monitor are dithering around about it.  
(Commissioner 6, CCG1, November 2013) 
A different CCG1 commissioner noted instances of passing responsibility between different 
regulators, in this case between Monitor and NHSE, which frustrated commissioners searching for 
clear cut answers. The commissioners were also engaged in discussions with Monitor and the TDA 
about opening up some services to competition which might destabilise the acute providers.  
Another complex issue on which the CCGs wanted to consult the regulators related to opening up 
services to competition which were not a commissioning priority. Commissioners from CCG1 were 
approached by potential providers (in this case a GP practice) willing to provide such services in the 
community.  The issue was further complicated by the fact that CCGs are GP membership 
organisations giving rise to potential conflicts of interest due to GPs’ dual role both as 
commissioners and providers of services.  
We’ve got another practice that wants to provide a community ophthalmology service, but 
actually it’s not a commissioning priority for us, ophthalmology, so how do we balance that?  
I don’t know.  Monitor would say we have to go out to AQP for that, for a community 
ophthalmology service, but actually I’m not unhappy with the ophthalmology service we get 
at the moment, but as far as Monitor’s rules are, if there is an appetite to provide a service in 
the community, then those GP practices that want to do that under AQP have every right to 
do that, but do I have to commission it?  I don’t know.  Do I have to commission that service 
from them?  Monitor would say maybe you do, the same as the maternity one.  So it’s 
chaos... (Commissioner 6, CCG1, November 2013) 
Despite acknowledging that that the purist view of competition in the NHS appeared to have been 
watered down recently, one commissioner from CCG3 was concerned that Monitor might intervene 
and put a stop to the “controlled market approach” which the CCG3 pursued (Commissioner 1, 
CCG3, August 2013). The worry remained that if one followed a strict interpretation of the rules, the 
decisions, such as not putting CHS out to tender, would not be possible. The commissioner was also 
16 
 
concerned about the lack of guidance with regards to LES services, tendering of which had a 
potential to destabilise GP practices and undermine relationships with GPs.  
CCG4 commissioners had been engaged with Monitor’s predecessor, the CCP, seeking advice on the 
future model for their community services. At the time, commissioners were seeking clarification 
from regulators on how they could set up an integrated care organisation bringing together services 
delivered by the NHS and the LA which would not fall foul of competition rules. The advice consisted 
of finding the way round it by offering a three year period of protection to the new organisation 
under an aspiring FT status. However, such a workaround did not protect the CCG from the risk of 
legal challenge from other potential providers. 
The Co-operation and Competition’s view was, (...) ‘We can give you this advice, but you must 
be prepared to say and stand up and answer if Virgin Health or another provider came and 
said, ‘Hang on, you’ve got a 55 or 120, 55 million pound Health contract with your community 
service provider, why haven’t you tendered it?’  (Commissioner 1, CCG4, November 2013) 
Although the commissioners found the CCP’s stance supportive of their proposal to set up an 
integrated provider, they felt quite exposed to the danger of potential legal challenges. The 
interviewed commissioner pondered the “what trumps what?” question – greater opening to 
competition or move to integration of services, both of which seemed to be pursued concurrently as 
government policies.  
Overall, commissioners in different case study sites differed in nature and frequency of their 
engagement with different sector regulators. The CCG1 commissioners were quite critical of the 
regulators’ role, citing examples of not offering timely advice when it was requested or actively 
challenging commissioners’ decisions. Commissioners from CCG3 and CCG4 had a more neutral or 
positive view of the regulators. It is not clear from our data what CCG2’s view of the regulators was. 
Arguably, one could discern certain wariness of sector regulators on part of commissioners, seeing 
them as not always on the commissioners’ side. The interviews with commissioners give an 
impression of a volatile system prone to unintended consequences and conflicts of interest which 
they tried to make sense of in their daily practice, but over which they feared losing control.  
Impact of HSCA 2012 
Given that pro-competitive policies had been in effect prior to its enactment, we asked 
commissioners their views of the specific impact of the HSCA 2012. 
Commissioners in all four case study sites were fairly unanimous in expressing their views on the 
impact of the HSCA 2012. The majority of comments reflected a conviction that the HSCA 2012 had 
had a profound impact in terms of changing commissioning structures. Although the structural 
changes instigated by the HSCA 2012 made commissioning work more challenging, interviewed 
commissioners noted at the same time that the HSCA 2012 per se had relatively little impact on their 
day to day work as many policies and regulations preceded the Act or were seen as independent of 
it.  
A CCG1 commissioner noted that the new commissioning architecture instigated by the HSCA 
resulted in increasing fragmentation, complexity and bureaucratisation of the commissioning 
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system. These comments were echoed by commissioners from CCG2 and CCG4. In particular, the 
way the commissioning responsibilities, previously within the remit of PCTs, had been divided 
between different bodies was raising a number of accountability issues and seen as extremely 
unhelpful. Commissioners shared a number of examples of fragmentation of commissioning 
functions which put CCG commissioners in the position of ‘responsibility without power’. In one case 
the transfer of commissioning responsibilities and a resulting change in eligibility criteria had had a 
direct impact on patients for whom the CCG was responsible while having at the same time little 
commissioning power. 
Bariatric surgery is commissioned by NHS England as a specialist service, we had 70 patients in 
the system pre April when NHS England took it over as a specialist commissioning that were on 
a waiting list for bariatric surgery, NHS England, from the 1st of April changed the specification 
nationally to that patients who had a BMI of less than 50 had to go into a two year 
programme, tier three weight management, all our patients had a BMI of over 45, but under 
50, so they said, you can’t have your bariatric surgery, from when they said they could have, 
they were on the waiting list, so they were taken off the waiting list and, yet, in the whole of 
[area], there isn’t a tier three weight management process, so I have got 70 complaints from 
patients, 10 of which are with MPs and NHS England won’t budge.  Is that barking? (…) to 
complicate it even further, we are not responsible, as a CCG, for weight management services, 
Public Health England are, Public Health England are saying, no, it’s not us, NHS England said, 
no, it’s not us, but we’re being told, it’s not you either.  So I’ve got 70 patients floating, waiting. 
(Commissioner 6, CCG1, November 2013) 
Similarly a commissioner from CCG4 reflected on the fragmentation of commissioning of cancer 
services with specialist services commissioned by NHS England;  screening services – by Public Health; 
GPs being responsible for identification; and none of these services commissioned directly by the CCG 
which nevertheless had  overall responsibility for reduction of cancer mortality in the population. The 
commissioner concluded that “the Health and Social Care Act, the way that it divided up all of the 
commissioning responsibilities, has been for me a disaster” (Commissioner 3, CCG4, May 2014).  
The increased fragmentation of commissioning was seen as “unhelpful in supporting cooperation” 
(Commissioner 3, CCG4, May 2014) between different service providers. The CCG2 commissioner 
commented in a similar vein that losing control over the commissioning of walk-in services, which 
transferred to NHSE, constrained the CCG’s ability to influence urgent care strategy. Another example 
related to creating disparity for the CCG2 population which was covered by two different LAs which 
had different public health services in their respective commissioning portfolios. Finally, one 
commissioner from CCG4 noted that the HSCA 2012 had had a direct impact in terms of transfer of 
estates from PCTs to NHS Property Services and community service providers which might have led to 
some localised discontent. 
As the CCGs were  being encouraged to collaborate with each other to increase their efficiency, one 
commissioner from CCG1 noted that this was tantamount to yet another reorganisation of 
commissioning bodies and ultimately to admission of the failure of the HSCA 2012 to come up with a 
workable commissioning structure. In their opinion, a trend to merge CCGs into larger units might 
result in going full circle back to the PCTs at least as far as the population coverage was concerned.  
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On the other hand, commissioners were in agreement that the HSCA 2012 had relatively little impact 
on the day to day commissioning decisions. This was because such considerations were guided by a 
number of specific regulations and policy documents some of which predated the Act.  
My view is that the Health and Social Care Act had had no impact at all, because it was 
happening anyway, because a lot of the procurement rules for us were just introductions of 
best practice, national legislation, and European law. So this whole notion that we were 
bringing in a whole new industry of competition in the private sector, it was happening 
anyway, and for me the thought processes we go through have not changed for the last two or 
three years. They’ve not been affected at all. (Commissioner 1, CCG3, August 2013) 
One commissioner from CCG1 noted that the HSCA 2012, due to its emphasis on competition and 
formal procurement, might give commissioners greater freedom in taking decommissioning decisions 
with regards to underperforming services.  
Another commissioner from the same CCG was sceptical about the impact of the HSCA 2012 on 
fostering competition within the NHS. This is because in their opinion there were a number of systemic 
barriers currently preventing ‘true competition’ from taking hold, such as patients’ preferences for 
local hospital services; the private sector’s unwillingness to provide services deemed unprofitable, such 
as emergency services; and the fact that most consultants who offer private services also work  in the 
NHS.  
Despite raising these concerns about the  impact of the HSCA 2012, one commissioner, echoing wider 
sentiment, emphasised that commissioning managers were trying to work through “this imperfect 
structure as best we can” (Commissioner 3, CCG4, May 2014) even though  it made their daily jobs 
more complex and challenging.  
Incentives to cooperate and compete 
As the study aims to find out how commissioners are using competition and cooperation as 
mechanisms in commissioning local services, we were interested in exploring their views on the 
incentives in the current NHS system to cooperate and compete. 
Amongst many existing incentives to cooperate and compete within the commissioning system, 
commissioners in CCG1 emphasised the current lack of adequate funding as being the strongest 
incentive for providers to cooperate. One commissioner from CCG1 contrasted current funding 
pressures with the past availability of funding, which had allowed the main local providers to grow 
their businesses concurrently through competition. In contrast, a finite amount of money in local 
health economies resulted in restricting competing tendencies and in forcing existing providers to 
adopt a more collaborative approach.  
Stop paying them, decommission something.  Take something off something that actually 
fundamentally destabilises one of them financially.  Then it may get them to start talking.  
(Commissioner 3, CCG1, April 2014)   
According to this commissioner such moves are supposed to encourage the providers to examine 
and identify their own inefficiencies and biggest pressure points in order that they could be 
addressed holistically by the local health economy.  
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However as insufficient funding combined with the Payment by Results funding structure made 
service provision more akin to a zero sum game for providers, it could also promote competitive 
tendencies. 
Both [Trust X] and [Trust Y] are mindful that really there should only be one provider of 
community services and it’s me, I want to be it, sort of thing.  So there are tensions in that 
they are overwhelmingly friendly, but you can cut the atmosphere with a knife at times when 
we’re discussing things on the table that might mean that some business is taken off them, 
but the actual terms of reference are in the [provider commissioner group] actually states 
that we’ll all, as a community, do what’s best for patients, regardless of which organisation it 
is.  So they say that, but when you start talking about the money, you can see the body 
language, you know. (Commissioner 6, CCG1, November 2013)  
General views on competition and collaboration 
Commissioners discussed their general views of the use of competition and collaboration in the 
procurement of services, in the context of the HSCA 2012 and the National Health Service 
Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition Regulations no 2, 2013.   
Commissioners expressed differing views of competition, although all participants considered that 
competition was not the most productive way to use limited resources to procure services, or to 
provide the best service to patients.  Commissioners considered that the current government policy 
was confusing, inconsistent and stifling innovation.  Some aspects of the government policy for 
competitive procurement was seen by commissioners as coercive.   Overall, current policy did not 
appear to help commissioners achieve their objectives.  There was general lack of enthusiasm for 
competitive procurement, particularly where it was seen as prescriptive, for example: 
Dogmatically following one particular approach is almost always unhelpful. (Commissioner 
1, CCG2, November 2013) 
Commissioners appeared to conflate views about competition between providers to enter the 
market with patient choice, where patients had a choice of provider.  Commissioners reported 
finding ways around the policy to do what they thought best; commissioning despite, rather than 
with, the assistance of policy.   
Collaborative working with providers was favoured by all participants as a means of transforming 
services, with the important caveat that providers knowing that their services could be open to 
competitive procurement could be useful to stimulate collaborative working.  One commissioner 
noted that a local change management programme that the local health and social care economy 
had instituted prior to the HSCA 2012 had achieved service reconfiguration by commissioners and 
providers working together: 
It’s a long term change programme, which has been achieved through partnership and 
collaboration and which I would argue could not have been achieved through competitive 
procurement. (Commissioner 1, CCG2, November 2013) 
The requirement in policy for both for competitive procurement and for integration was seen to be 
inconsistent.  Commissioners thought competition and integration were incompatible and that 
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competition was not “helpful” in service transformation. One commissioner reported feeling caught 
between the policy objectives while trying to implement the CCG objectives: 
It’s almost like half the system wants there to be competition and half the system doesn’t … 
and we’re stuck in the middle, working out what we do and don’t want  (Commissioner 3, 
CCG1, April 2014) 
When discussing competition for the market, the commissioners’ views were underpinned by their 
beliefs about the NHS in general and their views on procurement:  
It just creates all sorts of stupid anomalies that are much more to do with trying to deliver 
political doctoring that they are about … delivering patient care. (Commissioner 1, CCG2, 
November 2013) 
The entrepreneurial thing just leaves me completely cold … I find it difficult to contemplate 
the privatisation … it is the political context that we’re in and those are the values of that 
context. (Commissioner 2, CCG4, February 2014) 
I don’t get the idea of competition for health services … so you’re saying there’s competition 
but only in these areas which then makes it a bit of a mockery … (Commissioner 3, CCG1, 
April 2014) 
The third of these quotations also refers to the inconsistency of competitive procurement, both 
geographically and for the type of service.  In terms of geographical location of providers, 
participants referred to the number of providers available to deliver services such as acute hospital 
services.  In areas with a small number of acute hospitals, commissioners saw no reason to tender 
services as there was a limited number of providers.   
Commissioners associated the number of acute providers with patient choice.  Where there was a 
small number of acute providers, commissioners noted that patients had less choice of provider than 
in areas with many providers.  However, commissioners in CCGs 1 and 2 assumed that most people 
wanted to use their local hospital, regardless of the availability of other providers. 
Regarding the type of service tendered, commissioners did not expect to competitively procure 
services such as emergency care.  This was partly because they had existing acute providers and 
partly because there was an expectation that no new provider would want to enter the market as 
the costs of entry would make the service financially unattractive.  On the other hand, where the 
cost of market entry was expected to be low and the potential financial rewards from service 
provision high, fragmentation of services was expected.  The opportunity for commissioners to break 
services down into small lots combined with providers wanting to bid for specific parts of the service 
was expected to result in greater fragmentation.   
One commissioner viewed competitive procurement as one tool in their toolbox, and chose what 
they considered as the best tool to procure the service they wanted:   
As a commissioner you’ve got to have a variety of tools in the toolbox, competitive 
procurement is one of them … you certainly don’t want to rule out whole areas and say: 
“Well you can’t collaborate” or “You have to competitively procure” or “You must use AQP”.  
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All you’re doing … is shooting yourself in the foot.  So I think you keep as many options as you 
can.  (Commissioner 1, CCG3, November 2013) 
When Government policy was seen as prescriptive, it was seen to be stifling innovation in 
procurement and service reconfiguration.   For example, one commissioner (CCG2) commented on 
units of planning1 and questioned why CCGs were allowed to be in only one unit of planning.  His 
view was that some services, such as patient transport, should be commissioned by larger units as 
they were operating across a geographical area larger than one CCG.   
There was a belief that other commissioners would be “cheating” in the face of “dogmatic 
approaches to commissioning” (CCG2), by complying with government policy and then finding ways 
round the system to do what they want to do.  In such a case, commissioning would be in spite of 
the policy, rather than the policy supporting the commissioning choices.   
Notwithstanding the foregoing views, competition was seen to have some benefits.  One 
commissioner (CCG3) felt that the competitive process helped commissioners think about how they 
chose providers because they had to show that they had not chosen their “local favourite” provider.  
 In addition, as mentioned above, one commissioner (CCG2) thought it was useful to have 
competitive procurement available to use in their toolbox.  Furthermore, two commissioners (CCG1 
and CCG4) noted that one benefit of the policy encouraging competition was that the threat of 
competitive procurement could encourage existing providers to discuss service reconfiguration, 
rather than risk losing the service.  Thus, the threat of competition was used to encourage 
collaboration. 
One commissioner considered that competition appealed to the “small business mentality of GPs” 
(Commissioner 2, CCG4, February 2014) who were attracted to bid for the work.   
Collaboration was seen by all commissioners as preferable when working towards integration of 
services and service transformation.  Integration through collaboration was seen as desirable for the 
NHS as it avoided the costs associated with tendering and bidding (CCG4). The workload associated 
with competitive procurement was seen as bureaucratic and demanding on the CCGs’ limited 
resources.  There was a view the bidding process favoured large providers who could write a good 
bid, and could exclude small providers with fewer resources, from the market.  Collaboration was 
also seen as beneficial in developing a sense of ownership of health and social care between 
commissioners and providers (CCG1).  One commissioner thought that service redesign could be 
handled by commissioners and providers working collaboratively to agree the content of the 
contract: 
You need some form of contract management … to say “this is the amount of money, these 
are the outcomes we want, this is the sort of market we use, you tell us what that [service] is  
(Commissioner 3, CCG1, April 2014) 
                                                          
1 A unit of planning was expected to be larger than a CCG area and its purpose was to prepare five year 
strategic plans for integration of services, taking acute trusts and local authorities into account. 
http://www.ntda.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Paper-J-Annex-1-Joint-Planning-Letter-4th-November-
2013-28-November-2013.pdf   
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In summary, the overall view of commissioners was that although competition had some 
advantages, and could be a useful commissioning tool, the service transformation required of 
commissioners and providers was more easily and financially efficiently carried out by working 
collaboratively.   
Summary of commissioners’ views 
Commissioners across the four case study sites found it hard to pinpoint exactly what the rules on 
application of competition within the English NHS were and thus whether or not they had to change 
their commissioning practices.  The HSCA 2012 itself had no major impact on their day to day 
practices as commissioners already had to balance cooperation and competition policy pressures. 
Some observed that the system seemed to be pulling in opposite directions of trying to instigate 
both collaboration and competition while avoiding giving guidance on the issue of which aspect was 
more important. Although the HSCA 2012 itself did not have major impact on commissioning 
practices, commissioners felt that it might change in future, as rules about using competition 
became clearer and were more robustly enforced.  
Although all sites preferred to use collaborative approaches to achieve transformation of services, 
CCG4 appeared to have greater experience of tendering and willingness to use competition as a 
potential commissioning tool. It is unclear whether this was due to having access to greater number 
of potential providers or due to personal preferences, experiences and convictions of senior 
managers and leading GPs.  
Providers’ views on regulations 
Alongside commissioners we interviewed a number of senior managers from acute and CHS 
providers in the four case study sites about their views of competition and cooperation in the NHS. 
This included both NHS and independent sector organisations. This section reports providers’ 
understanding of the regulatory landscape surrounding competition and cooperation, and their 
views about these issues. 
Understanding of current policy  
Rather than tracing the differences between providers’ views at each of the four sites we have 
compared the views of different types of provider, as they face different sets of problems and 
opportunities. 
Some of the acute providers we interviewed had FT status whilst others did not. One FT acute 
provider noted that understanding of and adherence to the regulations about competition was one 
of the conditions of providers’ licensing regime introduced by Monitor.  Yet being familiar with the 
regulations in itself did not solve the conundrum of fostering both competition and service 
integration. In particular one provider gave an example of issues posed by the proposal to 
concentrate specialist services in 15 to 30 centres. 
The question is, is how does that work with the laws as they’re currently…or how does that 
work with the guidance as it currently stands and it’s a…it’s dynamic, there’s no nice neat 
answer to that, it has to be a judgment call and, you know, there will have to be the 
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appropriate amount of consultation, public consultation (Provider 1, NHS, acute, CCG1, April 
2014) 
Another acute provider manager was not optimistic in assessing their own knowledge of the current 
regulations due to their complexity and vagueness. 
It’s an absolute nightmare and I don’t pretend to keep on top of it all, but what I will do is 
Google the latest bulletin or go to my procurement team or go to [name of person] from a 
legal point of view.  When they cut out the stuff about Section 75 and saying that everything 
had to go out to competition that certainly put the wind up us to think, everything? But truly, 
how are you going to facilitate that and is that really in the right…is that right for patients?  
So, no, I don’t keep on top of everything, but what I do do is I keep in touch with the FTN 
bulletins and it’s the FTN bulletins and the Monitor bulletins that I use as my source for 
things like that.  (Provider 4, NHS, acute, CCG1, June 2014) 
The same interviewee also noted that apart from difficulties in trying to understand the regulations 
fully, another question arose as to whether this was really necessary, as in their opinion it was not 
clear “how much attention do people truly pay to procurement law” (Provider 4, NHS, acute, CCG1, 
June 2014). They gave an example of being involved in tendering process and investing substantial 
resources in it, just to be told that commissioners had decided to abandon the whole procurement 
exercise and award the service to an incumbent provider. 
So, in my eyes, absolutely against the law, but would an NHS body ever challenge another NHS 
body when you’re talking significant funds, legal, a legal challenge? (Provider 4, NHS, acute, 
CCG1, June 2014) 
Another acute provider manager from CCG2 was concerned about overall “lack of clarity about the 
role of the market” in the NHS. In their opinion it was difficult to pinpoint a consistent policy 
direction in this respect which left a lot of space for inertia within the system as nobody seemed to 
understand where it was heading to or how it was supposed to work.  
Does the Government fundamentally believe in a purely market driven system or a managed 
system and if so – or a mixed system? (Provider 2, NHS, acute, CCG2, March 2014) 
CHS and MH provider managers also emphasised the general confusion about current policy 
regulations. One provider from CCG1 noted that the intention of some of the guidance was hard to 
discern. In particular, they were unsure about the aim of offering longer, five year contracts when 
tendering services. Giving a successful bidder a five year contract to get the service provision up to 
the standard which commissioners expected made the tendering exercise questionable in the first 
place.  
I was trying to get my head around whether in that the intention was that you really nailed 
down what you really wanted the end position to look like, but you were going to give 
somebody five years to get there, type of thing, in order to have the stability (Provider 2, 
NHS, community and/or mental health, CCG1, April 2014) 
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Another CHS manager stated that lack of understanding of rules about competition and 
collaboration and how to use them effectively to improve outcomes remained a major obstacle to 
commissioning system. 
There’s no clear framework, so people have got misconceptions (...) there’s a huge 
misinterpretation, misconception, and I think what would really help would be some very 
clear guidance on what this is really all about, rather than it all being a bit cloak and dagger. 
(Provider 2, NHS, community and mental health, CCG3, November 2013) 
We interviewed a small number of independent CHS providers.  One independent provider from 
CCG4 hoped that the number of services open to tendering would be increasing and would include 
all those which were currently delivered on block contracts where payments are agreed in advance 
for a set amount of care. Yet they also expressed some uncertainty about the policy direction and 
the degree to which independent providers would be welcomed to deliver NHS services. This meant 
that the outlook for his company remained uncertain.    
So the landscape, as we see it, we’re somewhat uncertain where people like ourselves will lie, 
whether we exist in three years or whether we exist when a new Government comes into 
power, we don’t really know. (Provider 2, Private, community and/or mental health, CCG4, 
January 2014) 
Providers reported that there was a widespread confusion among commissioners about whether 
they were obliged to tender all services.  One provider reported that it was difficult to keep up to 
date with national policy and relied on the bulletins from the Foundation Trust Network and 
Monitor.   
In three areas (CCG1, CCG2 and CCG3) provider managers reported experience of CCGs informing 
them that they had to tender all services. One provider reported that the CCG was saying that it had 
to tender all services, although Monitor and Government Ministers were refuting that statement: 
It was a CCG commissioner saying “Oh, I’ve been on a Monitor conference and we’re meant 
to, in any contract over this size, we’ve seen the regulations, it’s meant to be an OJEU2 advert 
and we’re meant to advertise it and do it in that way.”  Monitor and Government Ministers 
are saying, “Oh no, we didn’t say that.  We’re not privatising the NHS.”  Yeah, but their 
commissioners are. (Provider 1, NHS, community and mental health, CCG2, April 2014) 
A provider manager in CCG3 considered that the policy had gone awry.  His view was that 
commissioners had misunderstood the policy and interpreted it as meaning that everything had to 
be tendered, rather than think about the purpose of tendering: 
People have got misconceptions, mixed messages: “It’s all got to be tendered … it’s all about 
how do you get competition” … and that’s not what it’s all about at all … all the time we 
should be saying, how is this actually going to improve care… population outcomes … make 
sure that the taxpayers’ money is being used effectively … it’s a tool that can be used, it’s not 
a must do. (Provider 2, NHS, community and/or mental health, CCG3, November 2013) 
                                                          
2 The Official Journal of the European Union. 
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The same provider manager perceived tendering an “aggressive, negative tool” that was being used 
in some places instead of solving problems collaboratively by commissioners and providers (Provider 
2, NHS, community and/or mental health, CCG3, November 2013).     
A provider manager in CCG4 thought that the policy for putting all services out to tender was 
“muddy”, although his interpretation was that the imperative to tender all services was reducing: 
My understanding is that it’s now less of a requirement that it used to be … you have to show 
… value, which doesn’t necessarily mean that you have to put everything out to competition. 
(Provider 1, NHS, community and/or mental health CCG4, January 2014) 
To summarise, providers were also confused about the meaning of the current set of competition 
rules, and what they meant for them and their future in NHS service provision. They reiterated 
commissioners’ concerns about the vagueness and complexity of formal rules and a need for better 
guidance. The NHS providers reported that some of their CCG commissioners thought they had to 
tender all services, although one commented that he thought that commissioners had 
misunderstood the role of the competitive market.  In one CCG, two NHS providers thought mental 
health and community services were not treated in the same way as acute and GP providers by 
commissioners tendering for services.  The independent provider manager who commented on the 
view of their local CCG that there was an imperative to tender all services reported that their 
organisation did not want to bid for all services and that if some specialist services were open to 
tender, commissioners would find it hard to find new providers willing to enter the market. 
Amount of local discretion 
It was also important to understand the views of provider managers about the degree of discretion 
available for commissioners at local level, as those views are likely to affect providers’ behaviour. 
Provider managers reported that the extent of commissioners’ local discretion to act was affected by 
several factors, which overall, indicated that commissioners faced challenges in using their local 
discretion in commissioning services.  Individual provider managers made a variety of observations 
including: different commissioners were interpreting discretion in different ways; commissioners 
were choosing not to use competitive procurement where services were working well; there was 
differing levels of involvement of NHS England Area Teams (AT) in commissioning; and there had 
been a reduction in local discretion over the last five years, with a move towards a more centralist 
approach.   
Local discretion was reported by two participants in one provider organisation in CCG4 to be 
interpreted in different ways by different commissioners, who were basing their decisions on the 
cost of services.  They thought that commissioners were looking for quick financial “wins” and were 
looking at marginal financial benefits rather than considering service redesign: 
I think that different commissioners are interpreting that in different ways … if I were a 
commissioner and thought there were some quick financial wins and I’ve got financial 
pressures, then the temptation would be to do it (Provider 1, NHS, community and/or mental 
health, CCG4, January 2014) 
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I think they’re still looking more or less at the margin than at the fundamental (Provider 1, 
NHS, community and/or mental health, CCG4, January 2014) 
A manager in an independent provider in CCG4 also commented on variation between areas, and 
commented that GPs’ views about independent providers in the health system affected their use of 
providers: 
It’s a very mixed landscape.  Some areas … where the GPs are very receptive and if you say: 
“Look, we’ve got an excellent clinical team with no waiting lists,” they will … embrace it and 
use it, and in other places … they are very happy to use services which have … triple the 
waiting time, simply because they’re ideologically opposed to an independent provider.  
(Provider 2, Private, community and/or mental health, CCG4, January 2014) 
Commissioners in CCG3 were reported to have used their local discretion in deciding to avoid 
competitive procurement where the existing service was delivering what they required.  This was 
seen as a “brave decision” by one provider manager, which he considered was unusual nationally: 
Nationally that’s not the way that things are going… it seems to have generated … interest 
from other parties, either how have you got away with doing that? Or, why have you done 
that, to them? (Provider 1, NHS, community and/or mental health, CCG3, November 2013) 
However, the commissioners’ view was reported by a different provider manager in CCG3: 
His line … is, “when we have to do it [competitive procurement], we’ll do it and when we 
don’t, we won’t.  (Provider 5, NHS, acute, CCG3, December 2013) 
This provider manager was unhappy about the CCG’s decision to avoid competitive procurement and 
had taken advice about challenging their decision not to tender for a service. He had been informed 
that the provider had an argument which it could take to Monitor, with a high expectation that the 
decision would be overturned.  However, the provider decided not to challenge the CCG’s decision 
because they wanted to have a good working relationship with the CCG in the future.  Thus, local 
discretion was exercised by the CCG without challenge. 
The role of the NHS England Area Teams was reported as being more open to local interpretation, 
because there was no framework for its role in commissioning.  A provider manager in CCG3 
reported that some ATs were more involved than others with CCGs and this was affecting how 
“hawkish” or “doveish” CCGs were in their approach to commissioning.  Thus, there appeared to be 
discretion at AT level too. 
A provider manager in CCG1 commented that in his view the amount of local discretion had reduced 
over the previous few years.  This provider manager indicated that the reduction in local discretion 
he had experienced had had an impact on the collaborative working relationship between his 
organization and the CCG.   
My frustration is, we have a very good relationship with our local CCG … we’re completely on 
the same page … but one of things I’ve found at an increased level over the last five years is 
the ability to locally do things seems to be gradually being diminished.  There feels to me to 
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be more of a centralist approach being over this, the flexibilities locally feel less. (Provider 1, 
NHS, acute, CCG1, April 2014) 
A provider manager in CCG2 also commented on central government’s relationship with acute 
providers and how it affected local discretion.  His view was that acute hospitals were too politically 
sensitive to be allowed to fail financially, and as the public hold central government to account for 
local health services, central government found it hard to relinquish control over acute trusts.   
what happens to your local hospital … how good your local health service is, is always going 
to be a Political, with a big P, issue … there’ll always be votes in it.  And I think politicians find 
it very, very hard to let go … because the voters will hold them to account for it.  Particularly 
here [England] where it’s still seen as a national treasure.  (Provider 2, NHS, acute, CCG2, 
March 2014) 
An independent provider manager commented on her experience of local discretion.  Her view was 
that the rules forced the commissioners to award contracts based on bids matching criteria that did 
not take the desirability of the provider into account: 
I think there are rules there that people – you can’t bend the rules and I’m not saying you 
should bend the rules, but there are rules that … you have to get this score, that score, that 
score, that score, okay … I think you need to say: “… that’s fine, but you need to look at who 
the company is, who’s won it?  Are they somebody you really want?”  But … this has been my 
experience, because they’ve ticked all the boxes, they’ve got it.  I’m not saying the 
commissioners were happy, ‘cause they were not, but they’ve got it.  That’s wrong. (Provider 
6, Private, community and/or mental health, CCG2, May 2014) 
In summary, local discretion was seen by several provider managers as having been reduced, and by 
other provider managers as being affected by factors outside local control, and by the approach of 
ATs to their involvement in commissioning by CCGs, which varied. 
Views on the role of sector regulators 
Managers in providers in three of the four case study sites (CCG2, CCG3 and CCG4) commented on 
the range of organisations that they considered to be involved in regulating the health sector. The 
organisations and people involved in regulation named were: Monitor; CQC; NHSE through the 
agency of ATs; OFT, replaced by the CMA; the TDA; the Prime Minister; and Secretary of State.  
Monitor was the most widely mentioned regulator.   
One provider manager felt that the relationship between the different regulators was not clear and 
there was no overall organisation responsible for regulation: 
The interactions between the different regulators is confused.  No, there used to be … an 
organisation that was clearly responsible for … holding the ring, in the shape of SHAs, that’s 
disappeared. (Provider 2, NHS, acute, CCG2, March 2014) 
The same participant commented that Monitor was expected to promote cooperation, competition 
and integration, which he thought could not be combined.  A provider manager in CCG3 expressed a 
similar view: 
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I know that Monitor has the duty both to ensure cooperation, but also to develop 
competition and the great … debate from the commentators on the NHS is whether it’s 
possible to do both. (Provider 5, NHS, acute, CCG3, December 2013) 
Another provider manager (CCG3) considered that there was confusion about Monitor's actions, 
described as “misinformation” and “misunderstanding”, which commissioners were using as an 
excuse for their actions.   
Monitor would say, that’s not what it’s about, and people are … using it to do other things, 
rather than to say what are we all here to do? (Provider 2, NHS, community and/or mental 
health, CCG3, November 2013) 
The interaction of different organisations involved in regulation had an impact on the work of 
providers, according to an acute provider manager who pointed out that different organisations had 
different reporting requirements from providers: 
There are also issues in terms of the relationship between Monitor, CQC and NHS England 
and certainly very practically with winter as an example and as we’re told, the Prime 
Minister’s personal involvement and the Secretary of State’s personal involvement in winter, 
we’re getting very confusing and disorganised behaviour in terms of the requirements from 
Monitor as our regulator, the requirement from NHS England, which is transacted through 
the area team, through the CCG to us and I’m sure, at some point, the CQC, certainly with the 
first two, just to, kind of, give you an example, where  now all foundation trusts are on 
weekly reporting for winter with Monitor, we also do daily reporting for NHS England 
through the CCG and those two returns collect different data, which is farcical, absolutely 
farcical! (Provider 5, NHS, acute, CCG3, December 2013) 
This provider manager noted the role of the AT in translating requirements from Monitor to the 
CCG, before these were received by the acute trust.  Therefore the variable role of ATs observed in 
influencing local discretion of CCGs was also apparent in the regulation of providers.   
Participants in the CCG2, CCG3 and CCG4 commented on service reconfiguration being held up by 
disagreements between regulatory bodies.  One provider in CCG3 talked about the approval of 
Foundation Trusts being delayed because Monitor and CQC were “wrangling”.  An acute provider 
manager  in CCG2 thought that the failure of plans to merge acute hospitals in Bournemouth and 
Poole was evidence that the CC did not understand the health sector, and were trying to treat 
hospitals the same way that they would treat ‘Marks and Spencer’ or ‘Sainsburys’.  A provider 
manager in CCG4 also commented on this proposed merger and reported having taken advice about 
the potential impact on local hospital provision of service reconfiguration: 
The Office of Fair Trading [sic] can take a view on this as well.  And they’ll go, ‘cause it’s their 
job, they’ll go, “Well, this isn’t competition, is it?  If you’re saying we’re going to, on a 
planned basis, reshape the services … so that you get critical mass and standards go up 
because of centres of excellence … then you’re reducing competition.”  Yeah, we absolutely 
are.  So they’re [laughter] not going to like that.  (Provider 1, NHS, community and/or mental 
health, CCG4, January 2014) 
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An independent provider in CCG4 reported that they had contacted Monitor to ask if pressure could 
be put on commissioners.  They found that Monitor were interested in acute trusts and not in 
independent providers because they were too small.  This provider manager commented that they 
would not "place much faith in Monitor".   
A provider manager of CHS in CCG2 commented that local services on the boundary of health and 
social care, such as domiciliary visits, were affected by regulation of the LA.  Severe financial 
constraints in the LA were described as resulting in a reduction of social service provision, both in 
terms of the content of services and the number of people receiving them.  The community trust 
found that its workload had increased because health care staff were dealing with service users’ 
problems that would previously have been handled by social care staff.   
In summary, in common with commissioners, the regulation of the health sector was seen as 
muddled by provider managers, with the regulatory organisation Monitor having conflicting duties.  
The interaction of regulatory organisations had an impact on service reconfiguration and workload 
for providers.  An independent provider manager noted that Monitor did not show much interest in 
the place of small providers in the NHS market.  One community trust had experienced the impact of 
regulation of another sector, in this case, the local authority, on the services it provided. 
Impact of HSCA 2012 
The changes to the English NHS in general, including the HSCA 2012, have led to uncertainty 
amongst providers.  Some providers saw the HSCA 2012 as a distraction to the NHS; the system had 
seized up for over two years and they considered that there were more important priorities for the 
NHS, such as dealing with financial pressures and quality of patient care.    
Provider managers thought that the NHS market was developing prior to the HSCA 2012 and that the 
legislation made little difference to competition and cooperation, except that it legitimised increased 
competition that some commissioners had wanted to introduce in any event.   
However, provider managers saw that some providers (e.g, large FTs) with great market power were 
a block to integration of care.  The continuation of the disparity of the funding mechanism of acute 
trusts and GPs by a form of fee for service payment, compared with block funding for MH services 
and CHS was seen to be a barrier to service reconfiguration.  This was linked to the HSCA 2012. 
Cooperation was widely seen to be essential for service reconfiguration, and the HSCA 2012 was 
seen unhelpful in enabling cooperative working across the health economy.  Provider managers 
noted that there were recent policy moves to rejoin parts of the health economy fragmented by 
recent restructuring.   
Benefits of the HSCA 2012 were seen as being that it created a legal requirement to deliver contracts 
and encouraged pooling of resources.  Competition could be seen as helpful where it led to 
improved quality and efficiency, but there was doubt about whether competition would have this 
outcome in practice.   
Provider managers saw the CCG commissioners' roles established by the HSCA 2012 as difficult and 
challenging.  Clinical leadership of commissioning was seen as having an impact, although there was 
the potential for conflict of interest for GPs.  The approach of LAs to commissioning services had 
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changed the contracting environment for providers.  LAs were seen to place more emphasis on the 
cost of service than the quality of service than the previous NHS commissioners had done.  This 
particularly affected the boundary between health and social care, where services overlapped, such 
as domiciliary visits.   
Incentives to cooperate and compete 
Provider managers recognised that they navigated the system which included incentives both to 
cooperate and to compete. Providers exercised their own judgement which strategy was more 
advantageous in particular circumstances. For instance, a provider manager from an acute trust in 
CCG1 explained their competitive stance regarding provision of CHS which may involve some form of 
collaboration with another trust to increase their competitiveness:  
There will be things and some things coming up that we will be fiercely competitive on and 
we do not want to partner, whether that’s right or wrong from a patient’s point of view, I 
don’t know, but there will still be things that we will not collaborate on. 
Can you give me any examples of such? 
Well, we’ve got community services... (...) Now that tender is due out back end of this 
summer into autumn ready for an April start in 2015, big contract, big value, we want it, but, 
of course, I should imagine, so does the care trust and so does umpteen private sector 
providers as well.  So in that scenario, we absolutely would not collaborate with the care 
trust, we may collaborate with [another acute trust] to come together as a bigger body to try 
and squeeze some of that competition out. (Provider 4, NHS, acute, CCG1, June 2014) 
A different provider manager from CCG4 expressed a similar view suggesting that the way the 
incentives were aligned in the current institutional environment forced providers both to compete 
and cooperate with each other, rather than rely on one single strategy. 
So in a formal sense, yes there is cooperation [between providers] in the patients’ interest.  
But there will be some things that they won’t want to share with us and some things we 
won’t want to share with them.  
And what would those things be? 
Well, anything that is going to give a commercial edge, isn’t it?  So any ideas that we might 
have for innovation or any ideas that they might have for innovation, details of their cost 
structure or our cost structure, you know, the usual commercial things.  (...)  the example 
people always use is the sort of oil industry and so on, isn’t it, where, you know, all the firms 
are in competition with each other, but they all share flights out to the rigs and so on, 
because it’s in everybody’s interest to do so.  (...) So there’ll doubtless be things where it’s 
mutually to do things together is better than doing them apart, but it doesn’t – it won’t – it’ll 
never be total.  (Provider 1, NHS, community and/or mental health, CCG4, January 2014) 
The institutional environment with dual incentives and pressures to behave both competitively and 
cooperatively put some providers in precarious position as they could not be entirely sure whether 
the course of action chosen by them would prove beneficial.  
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It’s almost like the Sword of Damocles, kind of thing.  So right, here you go, here’s the big, 
mad, axe wielding whatever over here, saying you have to do the following, but we also need 
you to work together. (Provider 1, NHS, community and mental health, CCG3, November 
2014) 
One CHS provider manager pointed out that there is a long history and culture of collaboration 
between different providers in the NHS especially in respect of patient pathways.   
There has always been cooperation between different parts of the NHS.  So, you know, 
clearly, as patients travel through the system, there has always been cooperation between if 
you like, hospital services and community services and so on and so forth, so, you know, 
we’ve always had that. (Provider 1, NHS, community and/or mental health, CCG4, January 
2014) 
More recently the push for collaboration and partnerships was thought to be due to growing 
financial pressures within the NHS, which resulted in providers having to look for efficiencies. Where 
providers were involved in bidding for tenders, they could choose to work in consortia to cover more 
of the patient pathway.  A number of other factors militated against competitive behaviour in some 
circumstances: for example,  there were no alternative providers in some areas; and some services 
were viewed as unprofitable lessened.  
On the other hand, the incentives to compete were introduced by fee for service payment 
mechanisms, the patient choice agenda, opening up some services to tender and the transfer of 
some services from acute to community settings. One provider manager suggested that a fear of 
being seen as colluding by the regulators might also serve as an incentive to behave in a more 
competitive manner.  
Depending on particular circumstances, interviewed provider managers behaved both competitively 
and cooperatively, reflecting the dual nature of incentives embedded in the current system.  
General views on competition and collaboration  
Provider managers shared their general views on competition and collaboration in shaping services 
and provider landscape. They discussed the view that tendering and cooperation were mutually 
exclusive activities; the role of patient choice in driving competition within the market;  pricing 
issues such as lack of fee for service tariffs in community settings making competition difficult; and 
the destabilising effect on existing service providers of tendering more profitable services. 
An acute provider manager from CCG1 spoke at length about the biggest driver of competition 
within the NHS being patients becoming more vocal and better informed and taking advantage of 
their right to have a choice of services. Although generally seen as a positive thing, the respondent 
was wary about its potential to undermine the viability of other services and providers. The 
respondent gave an example of the increasing number of patients from neighbouring areas opting to 
choose the respondent’s trust for treatment. It raised concerns at what point this would have a 
negative impact on neighbouring trusts which provide services to areas beyond the reach of the 
respondent’s trust.  
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If it’s what the patient wants then, yes, it’s right, but not if it’s at the cost of an organisation 
that delivers services way further over into [name of the area] than we’re interested in? (...) I 
just don’t know how you solve that enormous jigsaw puzzle, I think the future absolutely is 
patients choosing more of where they want to go and patients creating that pull. (Provider 4, 
NHS, acute, CCG1, June 2014) 
However a manager from a different acute trust in CCG3 remarked that although the choice agenda 
had been in the NHS for a long time, only some patients were aware and took advantage of it. The 
majority preferred to follow their GP’s recommendation.  
When we talk about Patient Choice because when you…certain people really get that and 
they really move it.  A lot of patients don’t, the doctor, the man in the white coat is the 
power, you know, they trust everything he says so they don’t necessarily take that choice on.  
(Provider 4, NHS, acute, CCG3, December 2013) 
The issue of conflict between promoting competition and cooperation in the NHS simultaneously 
was of concern to some respondents.  One respondent took the view that the origins of the 
elements of competition, such as tendering for clinical services, which have been introduced into the 
NHS so far were “political with a small ‘p’”. They were a “middle ground territory” which crystallised 
not as a result of clear ideological preferences for market principles but rather as a piecemeal 
introduction of European procurement law and other regulations.  
I worked in the middle of the Labour government and this policy was coming in, you know, so 
it’s middle ground territory now and actually it’s European procurement law, quite a lot of it 
as well (Provider 5, NHS, acute, CCG3, December 2013) 
Another respondent from an acute provider in CCG4 remarked that the balance between 
competition and collaboration was hard to undertake satisfactorily following the decision on 
Bournemouth and Poole Hospitals in favour of competition. He reported that there was a lot of 
concern in the NHS about the competition rules preventing change from being able to be 
undertaken at local level.  There was a need to rebalance the weights of competition and 
collaboration. 
I think we need to see a bit of a rebalance between understanding the benefits of 
competition.  I think we’re all sold on the risks of competition but there are benefits to it, but 
also getting some balance between that and how collaboration works, because we have to 
do both, if you see what I mean, and that’s quite challenging. (Provider 4, NHS, acute, CCG4, 
April 2014) 
Another respondent pointed out the difficulties in identifying the public benefit of both using 
competition in procuring clinical services and also in avoiding it. They thought the public benefit of 
either of these actions remained poorly understood and defined.  
Even where acute service manager respondents were in principle in favour of competition, they did 
not always exercise their rights to insist on it. They were afraid of damaging their relationship with 
the commissioner. An acute trust in CCG3 pondered about challenging the CCG about not putting 
their community services to tender.  
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We made an argument to say that those services should be put out to tender.  The CCG 
decided that the process would be too disruptive for the community services and so decided 
not to do that, to leave them where they were. Now we took some advice on the rules 
around that (...) And basically he said what they’d done was outside the scope of the 
regulations and actually we could make a very good strong argument to Monitor to 
challenge it, as he described it, with a high likelihood that Monitor would overturn their 
decision.  Now we decided not to do that for a whole host of reasons (Provider 5, NHS, acute, 
CCG3, December 2013) 
Several provider managers were critical of increasing competition in the NHS for a variety of reasons. 
One acute provider manager from CCG4 was concerned that tendering out profitable services had 
adverse effect on other services and that commissioners deciding to tender out some services do 
not appreciate fully the interdependencies of different services based in a hospital.  There could be 
unintended consequences. One example was given of tendering cataract service out to a private 
provider which resulted in financially destabilising the ophthalmology service run by the local 
hospital. As a result the hospital had to shut down the emergency part of their ophthalmology 
service and local patients had to travel further away to get emergency eye care.  
So competition isn’t new; had competition for a while now.  But I think it’s inappropriate in the 
Health Service and I think there are too many interdependencies in the Health Service.  So the 
minute you start leasing a bit out somewhere else then you don’t think about the impact that 
has on all the other bits, or the whole and that increases costs.  So I think everything that we do 
is just – it doesn’t understand the interdependencies that there are in running a hospital. 
(Provider 3, NHS, acute, CCG4, March 2014) 
Another reason given by the same respondent was that increasing competition in the NHS internal 
market was unaffordable as it produced higher overall costs for the financially challenged NHS. 
I went to a mergers and acquisitions talk and they talked about petrol station companies and 
how they – when one – you know, it’s easy for one of them to open up a petrol station at – 
under the same principles next to a competitor and charge a slightly lower price ‘cause it 
doesn’t cost them a lot because they’ve only got their marginal costs.  But the way they deal 
with that is that then you retaliate.  So you then say, “Okay, well I – if you’ve opened up right 
next to me I’m going to open up right next to you.”  And then both your providers have 
additional costs and no-one’s won.  So there’s only a certain amount of money in the Health 
Service and I think we are wasting money on these things. (Provider 3, NHS, acute, CCG4, 
March 2014) 
CHS provider managers we interviewed expressed a range of views on competition within the NHS, 
from critical to accommodating. One provider manager from CCG2 agreed that tendering was not 
compatible with tight financial situation within the NHS as lack of money was pushing different 
providers towards greater cooperation with each other.  But a respondent from another community 
provider in CCG2 saw a place for competition in the NHS yet claimed that existing governance 
boundaries restricted the changes which could be made by it. The lack of clear pricing structures for 
MH and CHS was mentioned by a number of respondents as an impediment to competition. 
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If you get the balance right, you know, between private sector principles, you know, motivation 
on one level – I appreciate that it’s a difficult balance, profit versus patient care, but motivation 
on certain levels from the private sector and certain aspects of, you know, large organisations 
succeed in certain respects – buy-in power, etc., etc. – then the economies of scale, and you 
applied some similar model to the NHS, then that agenda, you know, that procurement 
competition agenda would fundamentally, you know – well, it’d be delivered, but it’d be 
delivered in a non-fragmented, dismantled way.  I think it’d be delivered in a controlled, 
balanced and fundamentally more successful way (Provider 5, NHS, community and mental 
health, CCG2, June 2014) 
A CCG4 provider manager echoed the point made above by an acute provider manager about 
interdependencies between services. They expressed a preference for a whole system approach and 
raised concerns about the ability of private providers to cherry pick profitable services and 
undermine the unprofitable but vital services. 
Whether it be in hospital or Community Services and what they’re not cited on is the problems 
that that gives when you strip out that from, if you like, an overall bigger organisation and you 
undermine the sustainability of what’s left.  Now if you’re doing it at the margin, you know, in a 
sense that’s fine and it’s an irritant, but it’s not fundamental.  But if you do it to any large 
degree then you have a problem. (Provider 1, NHS, community and mental health, CCG4, 
January 2014) 
The view was also expressed that the operation of internal market jeopardized the trust built up 
between different actors, and thus decreased the quality of services commissioned. For example, there 
were cases where commissioners required extensive input from a provider to write a new or change 
an existing service specification, only then to decide to put the service to open tender.  
We have had some difficulties, I think, with looking at developing services in line with 
Commissioners.  For example, nursing home proposals, whereby it’s difficult to work something 
up and then, at the last minute, it’s been put out to private sector when we’ve done a piece of 
work in good faith, to get it to a point where we could pilot something and then, for various 
reasons, it’s gone out privately.  So there have been some instances where we’ve been a little 
bit bitten by the competition element (Provider 1, NHS, community and/or mental health, 
CCG4, January 2014) 
Concern was also raised about the transaction costs of competitive tendering, both in terms of 
resources dedicated to the process, and the delays caused by it. Several providers (in CCG3) saw 
competitive procurement as adding a cost to the NHS in the context of financial pressures, and 
slowing procurement, at a time when speedy decisions about service transformation were required.  
One provider commented that there were other ways to work: 
In some health economies we’re getting it right .. and the length of the [tendering] process, 
we would introduce inertia.  We would stop that progress for … 18 months to two years.  
Why would we want to do that … when there are so many strong drivers, like the fiscal 
environment?  … there are lots of other mechanisms that can drive us to look at things 
differently. (Provider 2, NHS, community and mental health, CCG3, November 2013) 
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The independent provider managers who expressed views on competition were more positive. One 
noted that the introduction of competition made commissioners better at managing existing contracts 
and extracting value for money from existing services as a result of having an option of procuring 
services in an open market. This made commissioners focus on whether they were getting the best 
possible deal from providers. Another independent provider stated that in their opinion the NHS was 
“inefficient”,  but independent providers struggled to overcome barriers to market entry such as IT or 
lack of engagement from NHS providers.  
It’s something to be proud of within the country, but is inefficient.  You’ve got ‘Spanish 
practices’ that partake or basically work within the NHS.  It was seen as a job for life.  There 
was no reward for innovation or to strive for clinical excellence, and we think it’s an outdated 
model for service delivery.  What the Government’s trying to do is bring in innovation through 
third party providers, but there’s quite a lot of hurdles to overcome, whether it be IT, 
infrastructure, finances or whether it’s just to try and overcome hurdles where, I suppose, 
providers such as the Acute Trusts or even basically community based Trusts are reticent to 
engage with us, ‘cause they see us as competition. (Provider 2, independent, community 
and/or mental health, CCG4, January 2014) 
One respondent viewed the NHS as too politicised a system for it to ever embrace purely 
commercial principles.  
At the very, very top of, I don’t know if you can still call it an organisation, of the system, the 
lens through which success or failure is viewed, the lens through which patient satisfaction is 
viewed, the lens through which financial transactions are viewed, it’s entirely a political thing 
and never a commercial point; all about electoral cycles, electoral popularity, electoral 
geographies.  And that’s endemic. (Provider 2, NHS, acute, CCG2, March 2014) 
The findings show that provider managers hold a wide range of views on the place of competition 
within the NHS from highly critical to more accommodating, seeing potential benefits of transplanting 
some elements of independent sector thinking into the NHS. Unsurprisingly, independent provider 
managers were more in favour of competition than NHS incumbents. 
Summary of providers’ views 
Providers shared many concerns that were expressed by commissioners about the rules governing 
competition with the NHS. In particular providers talked at length about a sense of confusion 
surrounding rules and many misconceptions that this led to. Some providers also noted the 
weaknesses of sector regulators, in particular Monitor, in trying to clarify the rules.  Despite being 
concerned with negative effects of competition within the NHS causing fragmentation of services 
and increasing costs, many providers were seeing competition as happening ‘at the margins’ rather 
than infiltrating their core businesses and strategies. They were preoccupied with the pressing  
issues of structural changes in the configuration of NHS services in the face of growing financial 
pressures. According to some providers that we interviewed such changes could not be delivered 
through greater use of competition due to additional costs that accompany operation of the market 
within NHS. Our interviewees did not know how the existing rules on competition, procurement and 
patient choice could be aligned with the greater push for partnerships, mergers and collaboration 
between providers. 
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Interim Conclusions 
The HSCA 2012 came into effect in April 2013, setting out a complex regulatory scheme to govern 
the use of competition and collaboration in the English NHS quasi market. The field work for this 
interim report was carried out early in the life of the new system, and may not represent how actors 
will understand the system after time has passed. Nevertheless, the findings are useful for policy 
makers and regulators.  
It is government policy that there should be a ‘fair playing field’ for all providers of care to NHS 
patients in order to enable the quasi market to operate effectively, with the aim of producing 
efficient high quality care (Monitor, 2013). One prerequisite for such a ‘fair playing field’ is that all 
actors understand the rules governing that market. Our preliminary findings concerning the 
understanding of the regulatory context of the NHS market by both commissioners and providers of 
care indicate that there is much work to be done to ensure that the ‘rules of the game’ are clear to 
all ‘players’. Not only was the plethora of written material seen as unclear, but the regulators of the 
system (especially Monitor) were not perceived as giving adequate guidance to actors. In this 
context, local commissioners  were exercising a degree of discretion about how to interpret the rules 
concerning the use of competition, which may, in fact, have been (and continue to be) advantageous 
to the urgent process of reconfiguring services currently under way. 
Actors in the system held differing views about the efficacy of competition as a mechanism to 
improve services. Although there was a general preference among commissioners to use 
collaborative approaches, many acknowledged that the fact that they could use competitive 
techniques if they wished has been useful in encouraging providers to collaborate. Competition was 
seen as a useful ‘tool’ to have at their disposal. Incumbent NHS providers were less enthusiastic 
about competition as a method to improve services than new entrants. The complexities of 
interdependent services and differing methods of payment were cited as reasons to be wary of using 
competitive tendering without careful thought. But small and medium size independent providers 
faced significant barriers to market entry in terms of the costs of tendering and difficulties of slotting 
into existing NHS infrastructure such as IT systems.  
Our study continues to collect data on what commissioning decisions are being made at local level, 
and whether the use of competition as a mechanism to improve services is increasing over time. We 
are investigating the extent to which planning and collaboration are also being used as mechanisms 
to undertake complex reconfiguration of services to move care out of hospital.  We will also re-
interview commissioners and provider managers in mid 2015 to find out if their respective 
understanding and views on the rules concerning competition have changed as the new system 
introduced by the HSCA 2012 beds down. We will report our findings in late 2015. 
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Appendix 1. Timeline of policies, rules and regulatory decisions on competition and cooperation 
Table 1. Timeline of policy, regulation, guidance and key events pertaining to competition and cooperation in the NHS commissioning process, England, 
(March 2013 – June 2014) 
Item 
No. 
Date Year Document title Type Summary of information pertaining to competition and cooperation in the 
NHS 
Source 
1 6 March 2013 Neurosurgery at the 
Royal Free and UCLH: 
advice on transfer of 
services 
 
Decision / 
guidance 
Monitor's advice to the Office of Fair Trading on moving neurosurgery 
services from the Royal Free to University College London Hospitals. The 
report gives Monitor’s view on whether the transfer would result in benefits 
to patients. Monitor concluded that “it is therefore not appropriate to treat 
the potential benefits submitted by the parties as relevant customer benefits 
for the purposes of the Office of Fair Trading’s assessment under the 
Enterprise Act 2002.” 
 
Monitor 
2 22 March 2013 Reviewing mergers 
involving NHS trusts 
and NHS foundation 
trusts 
 
Guidance Monitor published guidance setting out the roles of Monitor, the Office of 
Fair Trading and the Competition Commission in reviewing mergers (or 
proposed mergers) between: 
 2 or more NHS foundation trusts 
 an NHS foundation trust and an NHS trust 
 2 or more NHS trusts 
 
Monitor 
3 27 March  2013 Guidance on Monitor’s 
approach to market 
investigations in the 
healthcare sector in 
England 
Draft guidance 
/ consultation 
Monitor announced a consultation of guidance on Monitor’s approach to 
market investigations in the healthcare sector in England 
Monitor 
4 27 March  2013 Draft Guidance for 
providers of NHS-
funded services: 
choice and 
competition licence 
Draft guidance 
/ consultation 
Monitor announced a consultation of the draft guidance on choice and 
competition licence conditions for providers 
Monitor 
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conditions 
5 27 March 2013 Guidance on 
application of the 
Competition Act 1998 
in the healthcare 
sector 
Draft guidance 
/ consultation 
Monitor announced a consultation of the guidance on the Application of the 
Competition Act 1998 in the healthcare sector 
Monitor 
6 27 March 2013 Merger benefits for 
NHS foundation trusts: 
Monitor's draft 
guidance 
 
Draft guidance 
/ consultation 
Monitor announced a consultation of the Monitor’s guidance regarding 
merger benefits for NHS foundation trusts 
Monitor 
7 1 April 2013 Health and Social Care 
Act 2012 
Act of 
Parliament 
Health and Social Care Act comes into force. It includes Section 75 clause 
which among other things may impose a requirement for the commissioners 
to use competitive tendering when procuring services and adhere to best 
practice in procurement  
www.legislation.g
ov.uk 
8 1 April 2013 The National Health 
Service (Procurement, 
Patient Choice and 
Competition) (No. 2) 
Regulations 2013 
Statutory 
Instrument 
Regulations in exercise of the powers 
conferred by sections 75, 76, 77 and 304(9) and (10) of the Health and Social 
Care Act 2012 come into force 
 
2013 No. 500 
9 20 May  2013 Substantive guidance 
on the Procurement, 
Patient Choice and 
Competition 
Regulations 
Draft guidance 
/ consultation 
document  
Monitor issues a consultation document paving the way for guidance to 
clarify how the rules contained in the on competition in the NHS apply in 
practice 
Monitor 
10 20 May  2013 Hypothetical case 
scenarios – 
Procurement, Patient 
Choice and 
Competition 
Draft guidance 
/ consultation 
document 
Monitor publishes six hypothetical case scenarios considering how the 
National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) 
(No.2) Regulations 2013 might apply in these cases 
Monitor 
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Regulations 
11 3 June 2013 Briefing note on the 
application of merger 
control rules to 
pathology service 
reconfigurations 
 
Guidance Monitor publishes guidance on circumstances in which pathology services 
reconfiguration can be viewed as a merger and therefore subject to review by 
OFT or Monitor. 
Monitor 
12 11 July 2013 The Royal 
Bournemouth And 
Christchurch Hospitals 
NHS Foundation Trust/ 
Poole Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
Merger Inquiry  
Provisional findings 
report 
Report Provisional findings into the proposed merger published by the Competition 
Commission stating that “the proposed merger, if carried into effect, would 
result in the creation of a relevant merger situation because it would result in 
the parties ceasing to be distinct pursuant to section 79(1) of the Health and 
Social Care Act 2012 (HSCA 2012) and because the turnover of each of RBCH 
and PH exceeded £70 million in the UK and the turnover test was therefore 
met.”  
 
Competition 
Commission 
13 13 August 2013 Case: Proposed 
merger of Royal Free 
and Barnet and Chase 
Farm Hospitals 
 
Decision/guida
nce 
Monitor published a review approving a proposed merger between Royal 
Free London NHS Foundation Trust and Barnet and Chase Farm Hospitals NHS 
Trust. “The report concludes that the merger would be unlikely to result in 
significant costs to patients or taxpayers as a result of a loss of choice or 
competition.” 
Monitor 
14 20 September 2013 Case: Proposed 
merger of University 
Hospitals Bristol and 
North Bristol NHS 
Trust 
 
Decision / 
guidance 
Monitor published its decision to reject the proposal of merger between 
University Hospitals Bristol and North Bristol NHS Trust. “The report 
concludes that the proposals would reduce patient choice and competition 
and affect a substantial number of patients in the Bristol area on a long term 
basis. It states that the benefits of the merger would not outweigh these 
costs.” 
Monitor 
15 10 October 2013 Case: Investigation 
into the 
commissioning of 
elective services in 
Formal 
investigation 
Monitor opens first investigation into commissioning elective services in 
Blackpool area following provider’s complaint that patients are being 
directed to other hospitals. “In particular, the complaint alleges that the  
two  CCGs have sought to direct patients requiring elective care away from 
Monitor 
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Blackpool Spire Fylde Coast  Hospital (Spire FCH) and towards Blackpool Victoria 
Hospital (BVH).”  
 
16 11 October 2013 Monitor to probe 
CCGs' block contract 
 
Press article Monitor to investigate first two CCGs (Blackpool CCG and Fylde and Wyre 
CCG) over a breach of competition rules following allegations by Spire 
Healthcare Limited that CCGs are directing patients away from Spire Fylde 
Coast Hospital after entering into block contract with another hospital 
(Blackpool Teaching Hospitals Foundation Trust) 
HSJ 
17 17 October 2013 The Royal 
Bournemouth and 
Christchurch Hospitals 
NHS Foundation 
Trust/Poole Hospital 
NHS Foundation Trust  
A report on the 
anticipated merger of 
The Royal 
Bournemouth and 
Christchurch Hospitals 
NHS Foundation Trust 
and Poole Hospital 
NHS Foundation Trust  
Report Competition Commission rejects a proposed merger between The Royal 
Bournemouth and Christchurch Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust and Poole 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust on the grounds that it reduces competition in 
the market 
Competition 
Commission 
18 17 October 2013 Ensuring that patients’ 
interests are at the 
heart of assessing 
public hospital 
mergers.  
Joint statement from 
the Office of Fair 
Trading, the 
Competition 
Commission and 
Monitor  
Statement/ 
Guidance 
Statement outlining the joint working between OFT, CC and Monitor in 
reviewing hospital mergers, in particular aiming to reduce the number of 
mergers proceeding to formal review stage (by involving Monitor at the early 
stages of merger proposal) and to reduce the length of review process itself. 
Office of Fair 
Trading, the 
Competition 
Commission and 
Monitor 
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19 17 October 2013 Competition watchdog 
sees sharp rise in 
inquiries from 
CCGs 
Press article Monitor deluged by inquiries from CCGs unsure whether they need to tender 
services on open market. Monitor to publish guidance containing a series of 
scenarios to help commissioners decide whether rules apply or not.  
BMJ 
2013;347:f6137 
20 22 October 2013 Monitor asked to 
consider hostility to 
new GP providers 
Press article Monitor held a “call for evidence” about the commissioning and provision of 
general practice. Monitor to publish the outcome of this exercise by the end 
of the year. In response some private providers complaining about GPs 
crowding out private providers from the market and general hostility. 
HSJ 
21 24 October 2013 Analysis: Merging 
trusts caught in 'catch-
22' 
Press article Monitor has moved to address concerns that competition rules are thwarting 
much needed service reconfiguration. It follows warnings that clashing 
regulations are leaving trusts trying to merge in a “catch-22” situation. 
 
HSJ 
22 30 October 2013 Update on Monitor 
investigation into 
cancer services in 
Greater Manchester 
Press release Monitor's investigation into the commissioning of specialised cancer surgery 
services in Greater Manchester is to focus on whether NHS England and local 
providers broke NHS rules, which came into force on 1 April 2013 
 
Monitor 
23 8 November 2013 OFT clears London 
pathology services 
merger 
Press article The Office of Fair Trading has given merger control clearance for a pathology 
services joint venture between two London foundation trusts (UCLH and 
Royal Free London) and a private sector provider (The Doctors Laboratory) 
HSJ 
24 11 November 2013 Monitor suggests 
changing primary care 
payment 
Press article Monitor published the preliminary findings of its review of closures of 
primary care walk in centres. It followed concerns being expressed by 
independent providers which have been running the centres. The preliminary 
review suggests changing primary care payment mechanisms to increase 
competition between walk-in centres and GP surgeries. Also it remains to be 
decided who will have the responsibility for commissioning walk-in primary 
services (NHS England or CCGs) 
HSJ 
25 11 November 2013 Walk-in centre review: 
preliminary report 
Report Preliminary findings:  
In some cases, walk-in centre closures may adversely affect patients’ access 
to primary care.  
The division of commissioning responsibilities for walk-in centres is causing 
Monitor 
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confusion and could lead to decisions that do not take a system-wide view of 
the potential impact of changes to walk-in centre provision 
Walk-in centres would work better for patients if payment mechanisms were 
reformed 
Final report to be published in January 2014 
26 14 November 2013 CCGs told to work 
together as 'too small' 
for major change 
Press report A letter sent by NHS England and other national bodies is asking CCGs, local 
authorities and providers to draw up detailed plans for 2014-16, and high-
level strategic plans covering five years. 
The five-year plans are expected to be a platform for major service change. 
The letter says of them: “As CCG sizes and local configurations differ, a larger 
unit of planning is required for the development of consistent and integrated 
long-term strategic plans.” It adds: “CCGs will contribute to a larger footprint 
where one CCG is too small.” 
 
The strategic plans should include quantifiable targets against seven quality 
indicators such as life years lost from treatable conditions, time spent 
avoidably in hospital, avoidable deaths in hospital and patient experience of 
inpatient and primary care. 
HSJ 
27 21 November 2013 Providers looking to 
challenge CCG 
decisions in blow to 
integration agenda 
Press article Reports of smaller providers looking to challenge CCGs’ tendering decisions 
(especially relating to service integration and consortia forming) on the 
grounds of breaching competition regulations 
Pulse 
28 25 November 2013 OFT chief rejects need 
for law change on NHS 
merger controls 
Press article Clive Maxwell, CEO of OFT rejected the suggestion by NHS England chief 
executive Sir David Nicholson that the law needs to be amended to prevent 
the new system of competition regulation from obstructing improvement to 
NHS services. In his opinion early engagement of would be merger parties 
with Monitor and OFT – key to making sure the existing system works 
effectively 
HSJ 
29 2 December 2013 Practices 'could miss 
out on enhanced 
services' as CCGs 
begin putting them 
Press article CCG in Essex plans to put out LES to AQP tender in order to avoid any 
potential legal challenges and accusations of conflict of interest 
Pulse 
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out to AQP 
30 4 December 2013 A healthy market? 
Lack of transparency 
raises doubts about 
NHS commissioning 
Feature article “At least £6bn worth of work is out to tender in England’s NHS. But in the 
“arms race” between 
commercial providers vying for NHS contracts, there is much secrecy around 
how these contracts are awarded and how they’re really performing, reports 
Jane Deith” 
 
Article comments on secrecy surrounding Cambridgeshire’s £800m tender for 
older people’s services. Other tendering where private providers won by 
outbidding NHS providers on price (e.g. Suffolk/Serco). Reports on Monitor 
investigating NHS England area teams specialist tendering or lack thereof 
following complaints from providers 
“Some, including private providers, are beginning to doubt whether 
competitive tendering is really transparent and whether the winners are ever 
really accountable” 
BMJ 
31 5 December 2013 Trust super-merger 
shelved 
 
Press article A merger that would have created the largest provider organisation in 
England has been shelved. King’s College Hospital, Guy’s and St Thomas’ and 
South London and Maudsley foundation trusts along with the university 
King’s College London decided to halt the process citing doubts that such a 
merger would have been approved by the regulators 
HSJ 
32 6 December 2013 Exclusive: Health Act 
to be changed to 
boost joint 
commissioning 
Press article The Department of Health is proposing to change the Health Act 2012 to 
allow CCGs to delegate decisions to joint committees featuring two or more 
of them, or with NHS England. It would make it easier to make decisions 
spanning specialised and primary services – which are the responsibility of 
NHS England – and community and general hospital care, which is funded by 
CCGs. “The DH is proposing to use a legislative reform order, a mechanism 
which can change the law without a new bill, to “reduce burdens” resulting 
from legislation”. 
HSJ 
33 13 December 2013 Controversial Serco GP 
contract cut short 
 
Press article Serco contract for GP OOH in Cornwall will terminate in May 2015 as CCG 
moves to new model of OOH care. Issues with falsifying records and 
understaffing 
HSJ 
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34 13 December 2013 Leading foundation 
trusts explore moves 
into primary care 
Press article University Hospitals Birmingham and Newcastle Upon Tyne Hospitals 
foundation trusts plan to take over primary care providers in their cities and 
establish vertically integrated provider organisations; The Newcastle 
foundation trust already runs a minority of primary care services in the city, 
through Freeman Clinics − a joint venture with local GPs set up in 2008 and is 
a community provider. It wants to move into provision of GP OOH care as 
well. These aspirations raise concerns of existing community provider 
(Birmingham) 
 
HSJ 
35 13 December 2013 Julie Moore: leading 
trusts could run 
hospital chains 
 
Press article “Dame Julie Moore (CEO of University Hospitals Birmingham) told HSJ she 
wanted to see top providers running chains of hospitals, arguing the district 
general hospital could be “redefined” as an outpost of a larger trust”. 
Analogy with Tesco superstore and Tesco metro. 
 
HSJ 
36 13 December 2013 Public turns against 
NHS use of private 
providers 
 
Press article “The public is turning against the NHS’s use of private providers to deliver 
care, even when the care remains free at the point of delivery, a recent poll 
has found.   
Ipsos Mori asked 1,009 people if they agreed with the statement: ‘As long as 
health services are free of charge, it doesn’t matter to me whether they are 
provided by the NHS or a private company.’ 
It found that 47% of people disagreed with this statement, an increase of 11 
percentage points on the number of people who disagreed when asked in 
February 2011. 
However, it also found that people are less likely to be against external 
providers who are charity or voluntary organisations.” 
 
Pulse 
37 17 December 2013 NHS procurement 
standards updated  
 
Press release “NHS England has beefed up procurement guidance with new documents 
covering peer review and the evidence used to support procurement 
processes. The evidence tool provides suggests what evidence should be 
reviewed to meet procurement standards. The associated peer review 
guidance provides NHS organisations with an objective review process.” 
 
NHS Networks 
website 
 
https://www.gov.
uk/government/p
ublications/nhs-
procurement-
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standards 
38 18 December 2013 Science centres to be 
'hubs' of specialised 
services 
Press article NHS England plans to concentrate provision of specialised services into 15 to 
30 centres where “the highest quality can be delivered” from current level of 
over 300 organisations commissioned to provide such services. Academic 
health science centres should become the “hubs” of specialised services. 
HSJ 
39 19 December 2013 Procurement, patient 
choice and 
competition 
regulations: guidance 
Statutory 
guidance 
Monitor finalised and published the guidance on application of Procurement, 
Patient Choice and Competition Regulations 2013. It consists of Substantive 
Guidance on the Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition Regulations, 
Briefing Note, Enforcement Guidance, Hypothetical Case Scenarios and 
Consultation Response    
Monitor 
40 19 December 2013 Competition rules still 
impeding service 
change, say hospital 
bosses 
Press article According to HSJ/Capstick survey “Hospital chief executives still feel the 
competition and merger control rules introduced under the government’s 
NHS reforms are making it difficult to carry out important reconfigurations. 
Asked to rate out of 10 how obstructive the current regulations were to 
service change, with one being no impediment and 10 indicating 
impossibility, the average across chief executives was 6.8.” 
 
HSJ 
41 19 December 2013 Primary care 
commissioning is 'a 
mess' admits NHS 
England director 
Press article Proposal by NHS England that CCG should commission primary care (in 
particular OOH care) jointly with NHSE area teams, as the latter are too 
removed from the local situation to be effective commissioners. Yet BMA 
voices concerns over conflict of interest this will create and that GPs will have 
to performance manage own contracts.  
Pulse 
42 23 December 2013 CCG tells local GPs to 
federate or face loss 
of enhanced services 
contracts 
 
Press article GPs in Newham were told that “they have to federate or face the removal of 
local enhanced services worth up to 15% of their practice income”. This is in 
order to achieve economies of scale to be able to win the contracts for 
services. “Under the new competition regulations, CCGs will need to procure 
LESs from April, unless they can prove that the services can only be provided 
by a single provider.” 
Pulse 
43 3 January 2014 Local enhanced 
services worth millions 
Press article Some CCGs and local authorities are planning to put local enhanced services 
out to tender from April 2014 using AQP or full tender route. “Pulse 
Pulse 
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to be opened up to 
competition from April 
 
approached every CCG in England asking them how they plan to 
recommission existing local enhanced services (LESs) from April. Some 48 
CCGs replied, with 23 having a made a decision so far. Of these, nine said 
they plan to put some or all of their LESs out to tender – with the contracts 
collectively worth just over £2m.” 
 
44 4 January 2014 Bournemouth and 
Poole agree not to 
merge for a decade 
 
Press article Royal Bournemouth and Christchurch Hospitals and Poole Hospital FTs 
“whose planned merger was blocked last year have signed an undertaking 
not to attempt to merge again for the next 10 years”. 
HSJ 
45 6 January 2014 Monitor to protect 
essential services by 
licensing independent 
providers 
Press release “Monitor will regulate independent providers of NHS-funded services for the 
first time through the expansion of its provider licence regime. (…) 
 
Independent providers of NHS-funded services, including charities and 
hospices, need to check if they need a licence and, if required, hold one from 
April 1, 2014. The licence requires the provider to be led by fit and proper 
persons and registered with the Care Quality Commission. From April 2014, 
independent providers needing a licence and registration with the Care 
Quality Commission can get both through a joint process.” This is in order to 
protect essential services in cases of provider failure   
 
Monitor 
46 7 January 2014 Circle mulls bid to 
partner Peterborough 
with Hinchingbrooke 
Press article “Private provider Circle could table a rescue bid for debt-stricken 
Peterborough and Stamford Hospitals Foundation Trust involving partnering 
it with nearby Hinchingbrooke Health Care Trust” 
 
HSJ 
47 7 January 2014 Monitor kicks off 
independent provider 
licencing process 
Press article “From April 2014 all independent providers with a turnover from NHS-funded 
care exceeding £10m or delivering services deemed “essential” by 
commissioners will need a licence to operate.” 
 
HSJ 
48 10 January 2014 Legal challenge issued 
after out-of-hours firm 
Press article “Northern Doctors Urgent Care has issued a challenge to the process 
followed by clinical commissioning groups in selecting out-of-hours providers 
HSJ 
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loses bids 
 
in the North of Tyne area. (...) The grounds for Northern Doctors Urgent 
Care’s legal challenge are unknown.”  
Northern Doctors Urgent Care has lost provider status in two out of three 
areas where it previously provided OOH. It was the recommended bidder for 
the North Tyneside, but  North East Ambulance Service Foundation Trust was 
the recommended bidder for Northumberland while a joint bid from 
Gateshead Community-based Care Limited and Newcastle upon Tyne 
Hospitals Foundation Trust was recommended for Newcastle. This move may 
be part of a vision by Newcastle FT CEO to deliver “primary, secondary, 
community specialist and super-specialist [care] under one umbrella.” 
 
49 10 January 2014 Northamptonshire 
Healthcare drops out 
of £800m contract 
race 
 
Press article Northamptonshire Healthcare Foundation Trust withdrew from bidding for 
older people services contract in Cambridgeshire. Other bidders to have 
dropped out of the Cambridgeshire process include Serco, and a consortium 
between Cambridgeshire Community Services Trust, outsourcer Capita and 
private health firm Circle. 
The five remaining bidders are:  
Accord Health (Interserve with Provide, formerly Central Essex Community 
Services, and North Essex Partnership Foundation Trust as Mental Health 
Lead)  
Care for Life (Care UK with Lincolnshire Community Health Services Trust, and 
Norfolk Community Health & Care NHS Trust) 
Optum (formerly United Health UK) with Cambridgeshire Community Services 
Trust 
Uniting Care Partnership (Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Foundation 
Trust with Cambridge University Hospitals Foundation Trust)  
 Virgin Care Ltd. 
 
HSJ 
50 13 January 2014 Private firm withdraws 
George Eliot bid 
 
Press article Ramsey Healthcare has withdrawn their bid to run George Eliot Hospital 
Trust. “Ramsey’s withdrawal leaves four bidders: South Warwickshire 
Foundation Trust, University Hospitals Coventry and Warwickshire Trust, Care 
UK and Circle Partnership.”  
 
 
HSJ 
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51 16 January 2014 Private hospital 
groups forced to sell 
sites 
 
Press article “Two private hospital operators (HCA and BMI Healthcare) have been told by 
the Competition Commission that they must sell off nine hospitals between 
them in order to improve competition in the private healthcare market.(…) 
Further proposals announced by the commission yesterday include a ban on 
private hospitals using incentive schemes to encourage consultants to refer 
patients to their facilities.” 
HSJ 
52 20 January 2014 CCG backs down in 
patient involvement 
procurement row 
Press article “A law firm acting for campaign group Stop the NHS Sell Off in 
Cambridgeshire accused Cambridgeshire and Peterborough CCG of acting 
unlawfully by failing to allow opportunities for meaningful public engagement 
in the tender of a multi-million pound contract for older people’s services.” 
Following a threat of legal action the CCG agreed to publish some tendering 
documents. Commissioners are put in a difficult situation having to both 
protect commercial confidentiality and satisfy legal obligations of public 
engagement during tendering. 
 
HSJ 
53 21 January 
 
2014 Legal challenge issued 
over £16m service 
tender 
Press article Bexley CCG is facing a legal challenge over the procurement of £16.6m in 
services using the innovative prime contractor model. The award of the 
contract for the borough’s musculoskeletal work had been halted following a 
legal challenge from Lewisham and Greenwich Trust, which runs services in 
neighbouring boroughs. 
“The challenge came after the CCG overrode the recommendation of the 
trust special administrator appointed to oversee the break-up of South 
London Healthcare Trust that Dartford and Gravesham Trust should run high-
volume elective services at Queen Mary’s Hospital in Bexley until April 2015. 
Instead, the CCG issued a tender for musculoskeletal work due to begin last 
month. 
The CCG awarded “preferred bidder” status to King’s College Hospital 
Foundation Trust in November. Lewisham and Greenwich Trust were the sub-
contractor in Dartford and Gravesham Trust’s subsequent bid.” 
 
HSJ 
54 23 January 2014 Bennett sets out new 
approach for merger 
and failure 
Press article “David Bennett revealed details of how Monitor plans to act as a “translator” 
between the NHS and competition authorities when plans were devised for 
trusts or individual services to merge.” “without falling foul of the 
HSJ 
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 competition authorities.” Monitor blamed “differences in “language”” for the 
rejection of merger between Royal Bournemouth and Christchurch Hospitals 
and Poole Hospital foundation trusts by CC.  He said Monitor would support 
trusts to build a “robust” case for merger by engaging with trusts informally 
when they first considered a merger and again, more formally, once a trust 
had identified its preferred form. 
 
55 23 January 2014 Monitor watching CCG 
procurement decisions 
'closely' 
 
Press article “Monitor is closely observing the decisions clinical commissioning groups are 
making about transforming community services contracts”. Monitor’s CEO 
expressed concerns that proper procedures may not be followed to ascertain 
whether services require retendering or not and that CCGs opt to 
automatically roll on the existing contracts.  
HSJ 
56 24 January 2014 Ricketts: CSU 
privatisation 'doesn’t 
fit with NHS values' 
Press article “Commissioning support units will not be sold off when they are made 
independent, in part due to a lack of support for full scale privatisation from 
clinical commissioning groups, NHS England has confirmed.” 
 
HSJ 
57 24 January 2014 CCGs tell Serco to 
improve service 
 
Press article “Commissioners have insisted community services in Suffolk run by Serco are 
“safe”, a week after a council said they could be deteriorating.  
Ipswich and East Suffolk CCG and West Suffolk CCG said that after completing 
a four-month probe they had found “no evidence of harm to patients” but 
they told the private provider to improve in a raft of areas." 
 
HSJ 
58 24 January 2014 Arrangements to 
support NHS 
foundation trusts 
contemplating 
mergers 
Letter CEO of Monitor sent a letter to NHS trusts contemplating mergers outlining 
how Monitor can help in “Making sure any merger is based on a sound 
analysis of the clinical and other sources of patient benefit that should accrue 
from the merger, and that there are robust plans in place to make sure those 
benefits are realised in practice.” And “Ensuring that any statutory review of 
a proposed merger can take place swiftly and without excessive cost”.  
 
Monitor 
59 28 January 2014 Oxfordshire CCG 
compromises on 
 Oxfordshire CCG will accept a set of concessions, which reflect the DH’s 
recommendations and demands made late last year by Oxford Health 
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controversial 
contracting plan 
 
Foundation Trust and Oxford University Hospitals Trust to scrap plans to 
introduce “outcomes based contracting” for maternity services – one of three 
service areas it was planning to radically redesign. DH’s review “proposed 
that the CCG collaborates with existing providers, and only revert to going to 
tender if this proves unsuccessful”. 
 
60 29 January 2014 Integrated care 
pioneer voted out by 
GPs 
 
Press article Dr Stephen Richards, CEO of Oxfordshire CCG and a driving force behind 
attempt to introduce outcome based commissioning has been voted out of 
the post by GPs. 
The plans to go to tendering to find lead provider for adult mental health, 
maternity and older people’s services were halted when DH backed two local 
trusts’ complaints and recommended more collaborative approach.  
HSJ 
61 31 January 2014 CCG considers seven-
year community 
services contract 
 
Press article Bath and North East Somerset CCG “plans to re-commission its community 
health and social care services on an unprecedentedly long contract of up to 
seven years”. The annual value of the future contract is estimated to be 
£45m. “The CCG and council will share equally the funding of the 
procurement process, which is expected to cost £100,000 over a two year 
period. 
HSJ 
62 31 January  2014 Case: Investigation 
into the 
commissioning of 
cancer services in 
Manchester 
Formal 
investigation 
Monitor closed an investigation into commissioning of cancer  
surgery services in Greater Manchester by NHS England  (formerly NHS 
Greater Manchester) following complaints by University Hospital of South 
Manchester NHS Foundation Trust and Stockport NHS Foundation Trust. The 
investigation was launched in August 2013. The investigation was closed as 
NHS England decided to change the commissioning process in this case. 
Closing investigation meant that Monitor did not make any specific findings in 
this case. 
 
Monitor 
63 31 January 2014 Monitor competition 
probe closed after 
NHS England changes 
process 
 
Press article Monitor has closed its investigation into the commissioning of specialist 
cancer surgery services in Greater Manchester and Cheshire after NHS 
England halted the commissioning process. Original investigation has been 
instigated following concerns from two hospitals (University Hospital of South 
Manchester Foundation Trust and Stockport Foundation Trust) about NHSE 
HSJ 
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commissioning process. NHSE confirmed that it is developing new service 
specification and process. “In late 2012, providers in the region came 
together to form the “Greater Manchester Services Provider Board” to 
oversee a reconfiguration of cancer surgery services onto a smaller number 
of sites. South Manchester and Stockport believed the board’s process had 
not been fair. (…) NHS England has now told Monitor it would become “solely 
responsible for all decisions taken in relation to the Greater Manchester 
commissioning process”, and that the provider board would be “retained in a 
consultative capacity only”, according to the regulator’s statement. (…) A 
competitive tender to procure urological and upper gastrointestinal cancer 
surgery services will start next month. A contract for liver, pancreas and gall 
bladder cancer surgery services will be awarded to Central Manchester 
University Hospitals Foundation Trust.” 
64 5 February 2014 Serco pledges 
commitment to direct 
care role  
 
Press article Serco confirmed its commitment to providing community care services after 
signing a deal with social enterprise Bromley Healthcare to advise it on its 
troubled Suffolk contract. “Serco won a £140m three-year contract to run 
Suffolk Community Healthcare in 2012, although its work has been beset with 
performance problems”. 
HSJ 
65 5 February 2014 Fifth of GPs intend to 
work with other 
practices to win 
enhanced services 
contracts 
 
Press article Pulse survey reveals that 22% of GPs are planning to form alliances with other 
practices to bid for enhanced service contracts.  
Pulse 
66 20 February 2014 Local authority keeps 
all public health LESs 
with local GPs 
 
Press article Brent decided to allow GPs to retain all public health enhanced services 
without them being put out to full tender or be subject to AQP. “LMCs lobby 
other councils to follow suit”. 
 
Pulse 
67 21 February 2014 New strategy for 
south west London 
reconfiguration  
 
Press article Six CCGs (Croydon, Kingston, Merton, Richmond, Wandsworth and Sutton) in 
South West London “have formally dismantled their Better Services Better 
Value programme designed to reconfigure acute services. However, they 
admit service change is still required. 
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Surrey Downs CCG pulled out of the programme in November when its GPs 
voted against plans that could have led to a reduction in services at Epsom 
Hospital and St Helier Hospital. (…) While the BSBV programme solely focused 
on acute reconfiguration the revised strategy will more closely involve 
primary care providers, mental health trusts, community services and health 
and wellbeing boards”. 
A five year strategy is due to be published in June. 
 
68 26 February 2014 Case closure decision 
on the commissioning 
of radiosurgery 
services Case CCD 
01/13 
Formal 
investigation 
In June 2013 Monitor opened investigation into commissioning “of 
radiosurgery services after receiving a complaint from Thornbury 
Radiosurgery Centre Limited (Thornbury), a provider of gamma knife 
radiosurgery services (gamma knife services). The complaint related to the 
conduct and procurement practices of the North of England Specialised 
Commissioning Group and of its successor from 1 April 2013, NHS England.  
The conduct and procurement practices that Thornbury complained of took 
place either side of a change in the relevant rules. Matters occurring before 1 
April 2013 were subject to the Principles and Rules for Co-operation and 
Competition, while those occurring since 1 April 2013 are subject to the 
National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) 
(No.2) Regulations 2013 (the Regulations). We decided to focus our 
investigation on NHS England’s compliance with the Regulations rather than 
the conduct of its predecessors before 1 April 2013. (…) Since we opened our 
investigation, NHS England has confirmed that it has now entered into a 
contract with Thornbury. (…) Closing our investigation prior to a final decision 
being taken means that we have not made findings in relation to the matters 
under investigation.” 
Monitor 
69 5 March 2014 NHS England accuses 
Monitor of 
"unpicking" choice and 
competition 
framework 
 
Press article NHS England and Monitor disagree over the principles of choice and 
competition in the NHS resulting in delays in publishing a common “choice 
and competition framework” which is meant to help commissioners decide 
how and when to use these policy levers to improve patient outcomes. NHSE 
board papers reveal that Monitor sees their own guidance as “the key 
resource for commissioners to understand choice and competition in the 
NHS.” 
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70 6 March  2014 Analysis: Increase in 
procurement and 
competition 
challenges 
 
 “Providers are increasingly willing to use the procurement, patient choice and 
competition regulations to challenge decisions” as they become more 
familiar with the regulations introduced in April 2013. 
Monitor “had received 166 enquiries about the choice and competition rules 
“from a wide range of different organisations” since last April. Only 3 have 
proceed to become formal cases. 
 
Some providers claim that as there is “only a 30 day window to lodge legal 
claims, and Monitor would not complete an investigation within that 
timeframe, legal challenges were the best approach”.   
 
“Procurement and competition challenges since April 2013: 
Spire Healthcare against Blackpool CCG and Fylde and Wyre CCG (to Monitor; 
ongoing). Spire claims commissioners are directing patients who require 
elective care away from Spire Fylde Coast Hospital towards Blackpool Victoria 
Hospital. 
University Hospital of South Manchester Foundation Trust and Stockport 
Foundation Trust against NHS England (to Monitor; closed). The two trusts 
referred NHS England to Monitor over the commissioning of its specialist 
cancer services. Case was closed after NHS England said it would develop a 
new service specification. 
Thornbury Radiosurgery Centre against NHS England (to Monitor; closed). 
Complaint against NHS England for not commissioning gamma knife 
radiosurgery services from the provider. Case was closed after NHS England 
entered into a contract with Thornbury. 
Northern Doctors Urgent Care against Newcastle North and East, Newcastle 
West, North Tyneside and Northumberland CCGs (legal route; ongoing). CCGs 
split the out-of-hours provision into three parts. Northern Doctors Urgent 
Care was the preferred bidder for North Tyneside but not the other two 
areas. 
King’s College Hospital Foundation Trust against Dartford, Gravesham and 
Swanley CCG (legal route; ongoing). Dartford, Gravesham and Swanley CCG 
agreed that Moorfields Eye Hospital Foundation Trust could set up a clinic at 
Dartford and Gravesham Trust’s Darent Valley Hospital. King’s complained 
that a tendering process should have been held to provide ophthalmology 
services. 
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Lewisham and Greenwich Trust against Bexley CCG (legal route; ongoing). 
Lewisham and Greenwich issued legal challenge after the CCG issued a 
contract for musculoskeletal work in the borough, overriding the South 
London Healthcare Trust’s trust special administrator’s recommendation”. 
 
71 7 March  2014 Community trust out 
of running for £800m 
integrated care 
contract 
 
Press article “Cambridgeshire Community Services Trust’s bid for a £800m older people’s 
services contract for Cambridgeshire and Peterborough has been rejected, 
while implementation of the project has been delayed by six months. 
The trust, which is the main current provider of the services affected by the 
tender, had jointly bid for the contract with Optum, formerly UnitedHealth 
UK. (…) The four bidders which have made it to the final stage are: 
Accord Health (Interserve with Provide, formerly Central Essex Community 
Services, and North Essex Partnership Foundation Trust as mental health 
lead) 
Care for Life (Care UK with Lincolnshire Community Health Services Trust, and 
Norfolk Community Health & Care Trust) 
Uniting Care Partnership (Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Foundation 
Trust with Cambridge University Hospitals Foundation Trust) 
Virgin Care Ltd 
They are now expected to develop and refine the proposals they submitted in 
January. The preferred bidder will be selected in September, with the 
contract beginning in January 2015. It had previously been due to start in July 
this year”. 
 
 
HSJ 
72 11 March 2014 Integration 'pioneers' 
issue tender for 10 
year contracts 
 
Press article “Commissioners in Staffordshire are inviting providers to bid for two ten-year 
contracts for integrated services worth a total of £1.2bn. 
Four clinical commissioning groups last week issued a pre-qualification 
questionnaire for a single provider for end of life care and cancer care 
services. (…) The tender process is being run by Strategic Projects Team, 
which is currently hosted by Greater East Midlands Commissioning Support 
Unit”. The entire care pathway for cancer will be tendered at a value of 
£687m over 10 years under the ‘prime provider’ model.  End of life care 
contract is for part of pathway at a value of £535m. 
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73 11 March 2014 Competition rules may 
need to be applied 
differently to 
healthcare, says Hunt 
Press article “England’s health secretary has urged competition authorities to 
go easy on the NHS after the costly, failed merger of two trusts 
in the south of England last year. Speaking on 6 March to an audience of 
health service leaders, Jeremy Hunt admitted that the new competition 
regime introduced by the Health and Social Care Act last year had not been 
“smooth sailing.” He suggested that the competition authorities may have 
been overinterpreting their role in such hospital mergers as the one that fell 
foul of the authorities in Dorset last year”. 
BMJ 
74 12 March 2014 Brighton and Sussex 
and Surrey and Sussex 
pathology services: 
advice on proposed 
merger 
 
Decision / 
guidance 
Monitor published the results of its review into proposed merger between 
Brighton and Sussex and Surrey and Sussex pathology services approving the 
merger. “Monitor completed this review to advise the NHS Trust 
Development Authority on how the merger could affect choice or 
competition. It concludes the merger is not likely to have a negative effect on 
patients and taxpayers as a result of a loss of choice or competition.” 
 
Monitor 
75 14 March 2014 CCG wins legal battle 
over contract 
suspension 
Press article Lewisham and Greenwich Trust and Dartford and Gravesham Trust were 
unsuccessful in their attempts to challenge a procurement exercise run by 
Bexley CCG which awarded £16m in musculoskeletal work to King’s College 
Hospital Foundation Trust. They had previously been awarded these services 
in the special administration process which dissolved South London 
Healthcare Trust in October 2013. Yet Bexley CCG put the services to tender 
and awarded them to KCH FT. All parties agreed to discontinue the “legal 
challenge.  
HSJ 
76 19 March 2014 Richmond CCG 
pioneers outcomes-
based commissioning 
of community health 
services   
 
Press article Richmond CCG governing body agreed to re-commission its community 
health and social care services on the basis of outcomes. 
“The CCG says such contracts transfer appropriate risk to providers and 
create the circumstances and incentives that allow them to innovate and 
profit from success, provided they can manage costs and deliver the 
outcomes commissioners want. To deliver those outcomes and make the 
efficiency savings necessary to stay within the allocated budget, providers 
must collaborate, problem solve and deliver efficient, integrated services.” 
Inside 
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77 21 March 2014 Cornwall integration 
pioneer planning 
county wide roll out 
 
Press article “A partnership between the NHS and voluntary sector which is credited with 
reducing emergency admissions by nearly a third is set to be rolled out across 
Cornwall over the next 18 months. 
The Newquay Pathfinder, which was central to Cornwall’s successful bid to be 
a Department of Health integration pioneer, also led to a reduction in social 
care costs of almost 6 per cent. 
Under the pathfinder the 100 Newquay residents most at risk of hospital 
admission and with at least two long term conditions received targeted 
support aimed at improving their overall wellbeing.” 
HSJ 
78 27 March 2014 GP commissioners 
given green light to 
sidestep competition 
process for well-
performing services 
 
Press article “GPs have been given a boost in their bid to hold on to enhanced service 
income after the healthcare regulator told CCGs they can avoid putting 
services out to competitive tender if providers are already meeting the needs 
of patients. 
Speaking at the Commissioning Live conference yesterday, David Furness, a 
competition adviser at Monitor, said CCGs should continue services that are 
‘working well’ without putting them out to a full tender process or via the 
‘Any Qualified Provider’ route.” 
HSJ 
79 27 March 2014 Competition to run 
district general 
hospital is abandoned 
Press article “A tender process for the running of George Eliot Hospital Trust has been 
abandoned, it was announced today. 
The three remaining bidders in the process, run by the NHS Trust 
Development Authority, were South Warwickshire Foundation Trust, which 
wanted to take the trust over, and Circle and Care UK, which had both 
submitted bids to run it as a franchise. (…) 
George Eliot chief executive Kevin McGee, speaking to HSJ about the decision 
to scrap the process today, said it was due to recent improvements in clinical 
performance, particularly in its emergency department and avoidable harm. 
However, he also indicated that an ongoing national review of how hospital 
“chains” could be established in the NHS was a factor.” 
“The tender process began when the George Eliot board decided it could not 
reach foundation trust status on its own. Mr McGee today said he did not 
know whether it could gain foundation status, and that its focus was on 
improving clinical quality and finances.” The tender was stopped not as a 
result of quality of bids received. 
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80 27 March 2014 Bristol CCG plans 
£250m community 
services tender 
 
Press article “Bristol Clinical Commissioning Group has approved plans to tender the city’s 
community health services and said it anticipates “significant” interest in the 
contract from providers across the country. The services are currently 
provided by Bristol Community Health, a social enterprise created from the 
former provider arm of Bristol Primary Care Trust in 2011. Last year the CCG 
voted to extend the social enterprise’s three year contract by two years to 
September 2016. However, a paper to the CCG’s 25 March governing body 
meeting warned it could not be extended further without risk of legal 
challenge. It said there was an “expectation in the market” the contract, 
worth £37m a year, would be tendered when it came to an end.” 
 
HSJ 
81 28 March 2014 Major pathology 
reorganisation to go 
ahead after OFT all 
clear 
Press article “The NHS’s biggest pathology reorganisation will take place in May, after the 
Office of Fair Trading ruled it would not be investigating the plan further. 
The competition watchdog announced this week that the consolidation, 
which involves six trusts and will be hosted by Cambridge University Hospitals 
Foundation Trust, does not “qualify” for OFT scrutiny. 
The plan is a collaboration involving six trusts. Cambridge University Hospitals 
and Ipswich Hospital Trust will be hubs carrying out most pathology work for 
the area. East and North Hertfordshire and Hinchingbrooke Health Care 
trusts, and Colchester Hospital University and West Suffolk foundation trusts 
will retain host satellite laboratories which will carry out only urgent work.” 
HSJ 
82 31 March 2014 Nicholson: 
Competition 
“confusion” holds 
back change 
Press article The outgoing head of NHSE in the final speech expressed his regret that “he 
did not manage to make clear how competition can be used to improve the 
NHS.”  
“He said: “The confusion around competition, and the current way it’s being 
dealt with is holding back the NHS from making the changes that are needed.  
“It’s becoming a disincentive to making ambitious change. I wish I’d got that 
sorted earlier – I just haven’t had a chance to do it.”” 
The 
Commissioning 
Review 
83 March  2014 The Legislative Reform 
(Clinical 
Commissioning 
Groups) Order 2014 
Draft Statutory 
Instrument 
The purpose of the order is to enable joint commissioning and co-
commissioning between different CCGs and CCGs and NHS England. The 
order comes into force on 1st of October 2014. 
Legislation.gov.uk 
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84 March 2014 Explanatory Document 
to accompany draft 
Legislative Reform 
Order 2014. Amending 
the National Health 
Service Act 2006 
Guidance “The purpose of the draft Order is to amend the National Health Service Act 
2006 (“the NHS Act”).”  
“The Department wishes to remove this burden by amending section 14Z3 of 
the NHS Act to provide that, where any two or more CCGs are exercising their 
functions jointly, they may do so by way of a joint committee.” 
“There is also an identified need for CCGs and NHS England to be able to 
jointly exercise a CCG commissioning function and to form a joint committee 
when doing so.” 
 
Department of 
Health 
85 1 April 2014 Exclusive: NHS trust 
under private 
management faces 
deficit again 
Press article Hinchingbrooke Health Care Trust managed by Circle “is likely to record a 
year end deficit in the region of £600,000 to £700,000 for 2013-14. Such a 
figure would be a considerable improvement on the £3.5m deficit recorded 
by the trust in 2012-13, the first full financial year in which Hinchingbrooke 
was under Circle’s management.”  
“However, it would also mean the company will have injected more than £4m 
into Hinchingbrooke in two years, having originally pledged to bring the trust 
into the black in the first year of the management contract. 
Under the terms of the landmark 10 year franchise deal, Circle is responsible 
for balancing the trust’s books. The agreement stipulates that if Circle is 
forced to put more than £5m into Hinchingbrooke, either the trust or 
company can terminate the contract early.”  
 
HSJ 
86 1 April 2014 Two CSUs advertise 
for long term 
commercial partner 
Press article “Greater Manchester CSU and Cheshire and Merseyside CSU, which plan to 
merge later this year, have received 30 expressions of interest after placing 
an advertisement on the NHS Supply2Health website” looking for third party 
strategic partner. The exercise according to Leigh Griffin, managing director 
of Greater Manchester CSU “was not a tender or formal procurement”. They 
received submissions from “the private sector, charities and NHS 
organisations, ranging from niche providers to large scale consultancies.” 
 
HSJ 
87 3 April 2014 Commissioner serves 
notice on East Sussex 
contract over quality 
Press article “A Sussex Clinical Commissioning Group has voted to serve notice on its 
community services contract with East Sussex Healthcare Trust after flagging 
concerns with the current offering. 
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concerns 
 
High Weald Lewes Havens CCG has served 12 months’ notice on its £18m a 
year community services contract with the financially troubled provider.” 
“The CCG is hoping the 12 month window will give them a chance to work 
with East Sussex to develop a long-term plan for improving the area’s 
community services. 
However, the board report stated that successful service redesign of the may 
“include the need for procurement”. 
88 4 April 2014 Second proposed FT 
merger under 
competition scrutiny 
Press article “The Competition and Markets Authority has begun a review of the proposed 
merger between Frimley Park Hospital Foundation Trust and its troubled 
neighbour Heatherwood and Wexham Park. (…) The planned merger is being 
sought as a means to assure the future of services at Heatherwood and 
Wexham Park, following long-running financial problems and repeated care 
failings.” 
 
 
HSJ 
89 4 April 2014 CCGs open services to 
competition out of 
fear of rules 
 
Press article “More than a quarter of clinical commissioning leaders say they have opened 
NHS services up to competition – or are currently doing so – only because 
they fear they would fall foul of competition rules if they did not, an HSJ 
survey has found. 
And a fifth of respondents to HSJ’s latest CCG Barometer, carried out with 
PwC, said their groups’ decisions had been formally challenged under 
controversial NHS competition regulations.” 
“Around 20 per cent of respondents said they had experienced formal 
challenges to commissioning decisions or arrangements under competition, 
patient choice and competition regulations, while 57 per cent said they had 
experienced informal challenge or questioning (see chart). 
Some 65 per cent said they had experienced increased commissioning costs 
as a result of the regulations, while 46 per cent said they had not been able 
to change services in the way their CCG would otherwise have wished to due 
to the regulations, or concerns about them. 
The survey found 36 per cent said their plans for the organisational future of 
their areas’ providers – such as merging or becoming foundation trusts – had 
been hampered because of the regulations.” 
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90 4 April 2014 CCG leaders: Reforms 
have not improved 
control of cost and 
activity 
 
Press article CCG Barometer survey conducted by HSJ/PwC found that “the ability of the 
NHS to control costs and curb hospital activity has not improved with the 
government’s reorganisation of the NHS”. , according to many leaders of the 
clinical commissioning groups created by the reforms.” It also found increase 
in commissioning costs as a result of competition regulations. Furthermore 
respondents complained about “fragmentation of commissioning” between 
CCGs, NHS England and local authorities” and “dysfunctional relationships 
and arrangements” between national oversight bodies and regulators.” 
HSJ 
91 4 April 2014 Commissioning of 
radiosurgery services: 
guidance following 
case closure Case CCD 
01/13 
Guidance  Monitor has published guidance to commissioners based on the learning 
from Case CCD 01/13. The guidance “covers the following areas:  
 
-making  
 
 
 
Monitor 
92 4 April 2014 CCG awards £2.3m 
worth of enhanced 
services to new GP 
federation 
 
Press article “NHS South Worcestershire CCG intends to continue all of the current local 
enhanced contracts, which have a total value of £2.3m, by contracting SW 
Healthcare Limited - the provider arm of the local GP federation, which is 
jointly owned and run by all 32 member practices of the CCG - as one ‘prime 
provider’ of all services. This is the first known instance of a CCG 
commissioning all its enhanced services out to a new GP-led provider 
organisation”. 
 
Pulse 
93 4 April 2014 Commissioning 
services through any 
qualified provider: an 
HSJ survey 
Press article HSJ launched an online survey on use of AQP HSJ 
94 7 April 2014 NHS England planning 
new choice and 
competition research 
Press article “NHS England is planning to conduct new research on choice and competition 
in the NHS, according to the organisation’s latest business plan. (…) A central 
goal of this work is for NHS England, in cooperation with Monitor and the 
Department of Health, to develop and implement a policy research 
programme focused on choice and competition by March 2015. (…) Paul 
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Baumann, chief financial officer of NHS England, and Barbara Hakin, chief 
operating officer and deputy chief executive, are the national directors 
responsible for the work stream.” 
 
95 7 April 2014 Preferred bidder 
named in Bristol 
mental health tender 
 
Press article “A mental health trust which faced losing business worth £30m due to quality 
concerns has been named as the preferred bidder for the main lot in a highly 
contested tender for the services. 
Commissioners in Bristol decided to tender services provided by the £195m 
turnover Avon and Wiltshire Partnership Trust in November 2012, following 
repeated failed attempts to get the provider to improve service quality. 
The contract was split into five lots. The first and largest lot, for community 
mental health services, was worth about £17m a year. 
That lot also included a contract for a “system leader”, which would be 
responsible for co-ordinating provision between the five lots.” 
HSJ 
96 8 April 2014 CCGs 'restricted' by 
competition rules 
 
Press article “Dr Michael Dixon, chair of the NHS Alliance and president of NHS Clinical 
Commissioners believes clinicians are currently too restricted by an "over-
prescriptive model" of how to bring continuity of care to patients. (…) "We 
must free clinical commissioning from rules, regulations, competition 
restrictions and conflict of interest issues so commissioners and their 
constituent practices can plan and implement “general practice at scale”. This 
will then allow them to take on the ‘out of hospitals services’ agenda that we 
have all been talking about for so long," he said.”   
 
The 
Commissioning 
Review 
97 9 April 2014 Serco estimates £18m 
losses on health 
contracts 
 
Press article “Serco has estimated it will rack up losses of nearly £18m on three flagship 
NHS contracts in the coming years”. “The company has made provisions in its 
2013 accounts for substantial future losses on contracts in Suffolk, Cornwall 
and Braintree – two of which it is terminating early.” “Serco told HSJ last May 
that it expected to make a profit on its £140m three year contract to provide 
community services in Suffolk, but has since admitted it is heading for a loss.” 
HSJ 
99 10 April 2014 New NHS England 
chief 'more 
sympathetic' to 
Press article “Monitor’s chief executive has told HSJ it will be easier for the regulator to 
assuage commissioners’ concerns about NHS competition rules now that Sir 
David Nicholson is no longer in charge of NHS England. (…) David Bennett said 
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competition, says 
Bennett 
 
Simon Stevens, who took over as NHS England chief executive this month, 
was probably “more sympathetic to the role that competition and choice can 
play” in the health service”. 
 
100 16 April 2014 Circle awarded £120m 
MSK contract 
 
Press article “Private provider Circle has become Bedfordshire Clinical Commissioning 
Group’s prime contractor for its integrated musculoskeletal service after 
scooping a £120m five-year contract. 
The CCG named Circle as its preferred bidder to consolidate 20 separate 
contracts into a single service in August. 
Circle has said it is the first such integrated service in the country led by a 
prime contractor.” 
“Earlier this month Sheffield CCG agreed to commission city-wide integrated 
musculoskeletal services on a five year outcome based contract, which could 
be worth £40m a year. 
However, the CCG awarded prime contractor status to Sheffield Teaching 
Hospitals Foundation Trust rather than put it out to tender.” 
HSJ 
101 17 April 2014 Serco well positioned 
for combined call 
centre contract 
Press article “These reveal that the board discussed a paper outlining exploratory plans for 
a “health and social care coordination centre” last month. Under the 
proposals, the call centre would field its NHS 111, out-of-hours and 
community services contracts, all of which are up for renewal. The centre 
would direct patients to new “urgent care hubs”, potentially based at one or 
both local acute providers, and community-based “spokes” which would also 
deal with urgent care matters. The CCG stressed the plans were only 
formative and that it had not yet decided what kind of contracting model to 
use or how many providers it would want to provide the services.” 
“Serco, which already provides all the CCG’s community services including the 
care-coordination function, has already built in the area what it calls a “care 
co-ordination centre”. 
HSJ 
102 23 April 2014 Consortium wins 
£210m MSK contract 
 
Press article “A four-strong consortium of Sussex providers has scooped a five-year 
musculoskeletal contract worth £210m. 
The group was formed as the Sussex Musculoskeletal Partnership and 
includes Brighton and Hove Integrated Care Service; Horder Healthcare; 
Sussex Community Trust; and Sussex Partnership Foundation Trust. The 
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contract was awarded by Brighton and Hove, Crawley and Horsham and Mid 
Sussex clinical commissioning groups.” 
 
103 24 April 2014 Independent sector 
profits from lack of 
NHS secure beds 
Press article “A lack of secure inpatient NHS beds has driven a £21m overspend in NHS 
England’s budget for independent sector mental health providers. HSJ 
analysis reveals the organisation overspent £21m on independent mental 
health providers, 5 per cent more than its planned spending on this sector.” 
HSJ 
104 29 April 2014 NHS chief will take 
'pragmatic' approach 
to competition 
Press article “NHS England chief executive Simon Stevens has told MPs he does not share 
his predecessor’s concerns that competition law is standing in the way of 
health service reform.” 
HSJ 
105 1 May 2014 Stevens invites CCGs 
to bid for primary care 
commissioning role 
Press article “Simon Stevens has confirmed he plans to give some clinical commissioning 
groups the ability to co-commission primary care with NHS England.” 
 
HSJ 
106 6 May 2014 Pioneering pathology 
joint venture posts 
multi-million pound 
profit 
Press article “One of the first public-private joint venture pathology services for the NHS 
has posted its first multi-million pound profit since its launch in 2009, its 
accounts reveal. 
GSTS Pathology, a joint venture set up by Guy’s and St Thomas’ Foundation 
Trust and outsourcer Serco, posted a £3.8m net profit for the year ending 
December 2013, up from £300,000 in 2012. 
Revenues increased by 6 per cent from £87.6m in 2012 to £92.5m in 2013, 
according to the  accounts which were released as the majority-owned NHS 
joint venture rebranded itself Viapath.” 
 
HSJ 
108 12 May 2014 Supporting NHS 
foundation trusts 
considering a merger: 
proposed approach 
Consultation 
outcome 
Monitor published an outcome of its consultation on “the introduction of 
new arrangements to support NHS foundations trusts contemplating a 
merger or acquisition navigate the relevant regulatory processes”. 
 
Monitor 
109 14 May 2014 Competition authority 
gives green light to 
Heatherwood and 
Press article “The proposed acquisition of Heatherwood and Wexham Park Hospitals 
Foundation Trust by Frimley Park Hospital Foundation Trust has been cleared 
by the Competition and Markets Authority” “The CMA concluded 
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Frimley Park merger 
 
competition would not be significantly weakened because of “strongly-
performing NHS hospitals located nearby which offer similar services”. It 
listed Royal Berkshire Hospital Foundation Trust, Ashford and St Peter’s 
Hospitals Foundation Trust, Royal Surrey Country Hospital, and the Royal 
Buckinghamshire Hospital.” 
It said the “majority of third parties supported the merger” and that Monitor 
has told the CMA “in its view the merger represents the best available 
solution to improve patient services at Heatherwood and Wexham”. 
Monitor said in a statement it had advised “that the merger was likely to 
deliver a quicker and more sustainable solution to the issues faced by the 
trust than further regulatory intervention”. 
110 14 May 2014 Monitor welcomes 
CMA's swift decision 
on NHS foundation 
trusts' merger 
Press article “The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has cleared the proposed 
merger of Heatherwood and Wexham Park NHS Foundation Trust and the 
neighbouring Frimley Park NHS Foundation Trust. 
Monitor advised the CMA that the proposed acquisition was the best 
available solution to the problems faced by Heatherwood and Wexham Park, 
and the most likely way to achieve improvements in services for patients.” 
 
HSJ 
111 16 May 2014 NHS 111 procurement 
timetable will be 
'challenging' 
Press article “NHS England will spend £33m on reprocurement of technical elements for 
NHS 111 in order to meet a ‘challenging’ deadline of April 2015, it has said. 
It aims to find a provider for the technical ‘telephony’ system, which routes 
calls to NHS 111 through to the correct local NHS providers.” 
 
Pulse 
113 20 May 2014 DH defends 
reconfiguration 
process after foreign 
secretary's 
'intervention' 
 
Press article “The Department of Health has defended the national review system for NHS 
reconfiguration proposals after a local councillor claimed the foreign 
secretary had lobbied officials involved in the controversial plan. 
John Blackie, the independent leader of Richmondshire District Council, 
claims William Hague had intervened by speaking to both the health 
secretary and to the Independent Reconfiguration Panel, which is considering 
whether to conduct a full review of a planned shake up of hospital services in 
North Yorkshire. 
Under the proposed reconfiguration by Richmondshire and Whitby Clinical 
Commissioning Group, the children’s and consultant-led maternity services at 
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Friarage Hospital in Northallerton, North Yorkshire would be centralised at 
the James Cook University Hospital in Middlesbrough. 
Although the change has been welcomed by all GP practices and South Tees 
Hospital Foundation Trust, the plan was referred to the Jeremy Hunt by North 
Yorkshire Council in March.” 
 
114 20 May 2014 Trusts should 'twin' to 
boost income abroad 
 
Press article “NHS organisations are being encouraged to ‘twin’ with hospitals in countries 
like China as part of an effort by the government to help them secure 
international business deals. 
Howard Lyons, the chief executive of Healthcare UK, a UK Trade & Industry 
body, has also pledged to draft new guidelines to help hospital trusts open up 
new income streams by offering advice to their counterparts oversees.” 
 
HSJ 
115 21 May 2014 Strong bond' between 
Wirral's health 
authorities must be 
looked into, says 
Birkenhead MP 
 
Press article “THE decision making process of a Wirral health authority has come under 
fire, with Birkenhead MP Frank Field calling for an urgent inquiry into its 
operation.  
In a letter to Health Secretary Jeremy Hunt, Mr Field questions Wirral Clinical 
Commissioning Group's (CCG) relationship with the Wirral University 
Teaching Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, claiming relationships between 
senior members of the CCG and Arrowe Park Hospital may have dented the 
"independence" and "integrity" of local health services.”  
 
Wirral Globe 
116 29 May 2014 Urgent call for 
clarification on 
commissioning rules 
 
Press article “A row between commissioners and a private midwifery service in Leeds has 
sparked calls for “urgent clarification” around commissioning rules. 
The dispute has arisen between three clinical commissioning groups – Leeds 
South and East, Leeds West and Leeds North – and One to One Midwives, a 
private provider currently commissioned by four CCGs in Merseyside and 
Cheshire. 
While the Leeds CCGs said that they have not commissioned the firm, One to 
One told HSJ that the CCGs had told them in writing they would fund referrals 
from GPs.” 
““Some women who have been refused by some GPs, based on the CCGs’ 
message [have] individually complained to NHS England via the local area 
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team, Monitor and Healthwatch Leeds,” she said. 
Cathy Warwick, chief executive of the Royal College of Midwives, said “urgent 
clarification” was required around commissioning rules. She said: “Recent 
information about One to One Midwives, such as a Care Quality Commission 
report, indicates that the service is of a high standard. One to One… are also 
recognised as an NHS provider.” 
 
117 May  2014 Our new approach to 
transactions: 
consultation 
responses and next 
steps 
Consultation Monitor announced the results of consultation on proposed changes to its 
assessment of mergers between NHS organisations. 
“The key changes proposed in the revised approach to transactions risk 
assessment include:  
requiring a detailed review, 
bringing other risk factors into consideration in addition to a transaction’s 
relative size  
elements of our detailed review at an earlier stage as part of the new support 
arrangements outlined above  
detailed reviews, along with guidance on best practice for transactions  
lace of the previous 
dual ‘indicative’ risk ratings for continuity of service and governance.” 
“Overall, there was broad support for Monitor’s new approach to mergers.” 
 
Monitor 
118 3 June 2014 CCG makes 
"substantial 
concessions" in 
judicial review case 
 
Press article “Bristol Clinical Commissioning Group has offered to make a series of 
“substantial” changes to its policy on patient and public engagement as part 
of a proposed out of court settlement. 
The proposal is now being considered by lawyers acting for Protect Our NHS, 
a campaign group challenging the legality of the CCG’s current policy in a 
judicial review. 
Protect Our NHS alleged that Bristol’s procurement policy breaches the 
Health Act 2012 by failing to require public involvement in its decision making 
process. Bristol denies the allegation.” 
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119 3 June 2014 CCG pioneers 
outcomes-based 
contract for 
community health and 
social care services   
 
Press article Richmond CCG is looking to use the outcomes based contract for re-
commissioning their community health services. 
“NHS Richmond CCG has voted to look with Richmond Council at services 
including district nursing, paediatric speech and language therapy, podiatry 
for people with long-term conditions and cardiac rehabilitation it buys from 
Hounslow and Richmond Community Healthcare NHS Trust (HRCH).” 
“Richmond CCG spent £20m on community care with HRCH in 2013/14. 
Richmond Council has budgeted for £70m of adult social care services in 
2014/15.” The CCG decided to review the services because of the ‘variability 
of access to and engagement with the current service.’” 
Inside 
Commissioning 
120 4 June 2014 Heatherwood and 
Wexham Park 
Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust: 
advice on proposed 
merger 
 
Decision / 
guidance 
Monitor published its advice to the Competition and Markets Authority on 
the anticipated acquisition by Frimley Park Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
approving the merger. 
Monitor 
121 5 June 2014 CCG proposes 
awarding community 
contracts without 
competition 
 
Press article Consultation paper prepared by Northern, Eastern and Western Devon CCG, 
proposes that “the bulk of community services, including community 
hospitals, would be awarded without competition.” “The CCG aims not to 
tender services currently provided by Northern Devon Healthcare Trust in the 
north and east, and Plymouth Community Healthcare Trust in the west. 
It proposed that Plymouth and Northern Devon continue to provide services 
in the west and north respectively. However, the CCG wants Royal Devon and 
Exeter Foundation Trust to take on services in the east.” 
HSJ 
122 11 June 2014 NHS England mulls 
young people's mental 
health tender 
 
Press article “NHS England is considering putting inpatient child and adolescent mental 
health services out to tender in a bid to tackle “out of area” placements for 
vulnerable young people.” 
 
HSJ 
123 11 June 2014 CCGs could be caught 
out by 'technical' legal 
challenge  
Press article “A South West clinical commissioning group has reached an out of court 
agreement with NHS campaigners who claimed its polices on patient and 
public involvement were unlawful – in a legal challenge lawyers warn could 
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 cause problems for other CCGs. 
Bristol CCG maintains that “in substance” it has had “proper” arrangements 
for public involvement in place since its inception in April 2013. However, 
following the challenge by Protect Our NHS it has agreed to amend its 
procurement policy and constitution to describe the arrangements for public 
involvement in more detail” 
 
“The complaint began back in February as a demand that Bristol CCG halt all 
procurement activity under threat of injunction. At the time the CCG was in 
the final stages of the multimillion pound procurement of the city’s 
community mental health services.” 
124 16 June 2014 GP commissioners 
consider diverting 
funding to APMS 
contracts under 
'frightening' proposals  
 
Press article “A CCG is considering using directed enhanced service funding for a new 
model of primary care that would see practices switching to APMS contracts 
in proposals described as ‘frightening in the extreme’ by local leaders. 
In its plans to co-commission primary care, NHS Basildon and Brentwood CCG 
wants to pilot a ‘Prime Provider’ model of primary care by 2015/16, which 
would involve practices working as part of an umbrella organisation involving 
mental health, acute care and social care professionals.   
The CCG would fund this through combining budgets currently used for DESs, 
CCG funding and money from the local authority in a bid to try to improve 
care for people with long-term conditions or frail older people. 
The CCG says the contracts would be ‘entirely voluntary’, and would be 
commissioned under an ‘outcomes-based’ APMS contract.” 
Pulse 
125 17 June 2014 Optum and Capita bid 
for lead provider 
framework 
 
Press article The private firms Optum and Capita have placed bids to join NHS England’s 
lead provider framework for commissioning support services, HSJ 
understands. 
Under the framework NHS England is expected to award quality assured 
status to between 10-15 support service providers.  It is expected to go live in 
January next year. 
 
HSJ 
126 17 June 2014 Bidder for £800m 
integrated care 
contract pulls out at 
Press article “One of the bidders in the running for Cambridgeshire and Peterborough 
Clinical Commissioning Group’s £800m integrated older people’s services 
contract has dropped out at the final stage. 
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final stage 
 
Accord Health is no longer in the running for the contract, the CCG has 
confirmed. Accord Health is a consortium including construction and support 
services giant Interserve, North Essex Partnership Foundation Trust and 
Provide, which was formerly Central Essex Community Services. 
The three remaining bidders are: 
Care for Life (Care UK with Lincolnshire Community Health Services Trust, and 
Norfolk Community Health and Care Trust); 
Uniting Care Partnership (Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Foundation 
Trust with Cambridge University Hospitals Foundation Trust); and 
Virgin Care. 
The preferred bidder is expected to be announced in September. The 
contract is due to begin in January 2015.” 
 
127 20 June 2014 Sheffield aims for 
single health and care 
budget 
 
Press article Sheffield’s CCG and city council plan to pool “£237m more than required by 
national rules in 2015-16, with the “ultimate aim” of establishing a single 
budget for health and social care.” They also are “developing a single large 
contract for intermediate care in the city, which is currently dispersed 
between several services and providers.” “Commissioners will draw up the 
plans during 2014-15. A decision will be taken about whether there will be an 
open procurement to run them. The specification will consist mainly of 
outcomes desired, rather than the processes or services required. 
It will bring together a current set of around 20 separate but linked services.” 
HSJ 
128 20 June 2014 FT subsidiary takes 
over Circle clinic 
 
Press article “A private firm wholly owned by a foundation trust is to take over the 
running of a private clinic from Circle, HSJ has learned. 
SWFT Clinical Services, a subsidiary of South Warwickshire Foundation Trust, 
will take over the clinic in Stratford-upon-Avon next month. 
The clinic, previously known as Circle Clinic Stratford, is attached to a local GP 
practice. The practice will retain ownership of the facility, which provides 
outpatient services including diagnostics and day surgery to private patients.  
Circle stopped providing services at the clinic in April to focus on inpatient 
services.” 
“HSJ understands the venture will help the trust decide whether it can 
support its NHS services by moving into the private sector, and whether to 
offer private services at the redeveloped Stratford Hospital, due for 
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completion in 2016.” 
 
129 25 June 2014 Around 180 CCGs bid 
for primary care co-
commissioning 
 
Press article “Bids to co-commission primary care have been submitted by around 180 of 
England’s 211 clinical commissioning groups” 
HSJ 
130 26 June 2014 Exclusive: Monitor 
launches probe of 
community service 
contracts 
 
Press article “Monitor has launched an investigation into clinical commissioning groups’ 
intentions for the £10bn community services sector.” The questionnaire was 
sent out to every CCG “to scope the current state of the market in a bid to 
gather intelligence about how commissioners plan to improve community 
services. Most of the services are provided on contracts established under 
the transforming community service programme in 2010-11 and 2011-12. 
Many of these agreements expired at the end of 2013-14, but had an option 
to extend for a further two years and so are yet to be retendered.” “Monitor 
is expected to publish the findings of its research in the autumn.” 
HSJ 
131 26 June 2014 Delay to merger 
increases costs by £3m 
 
Press article “A proposed merger between Ealing Hospital Trust and North West London 
Hospitals Trust has been delayed by three months at a cost of £3m. The delay 
cost - revealed in North West London’s June board papers - will allow the 
trust to ensure the financial model for the merger takes account of a 2014-15 
contract agreement between the two providers.” 
 
HSJ 
 
